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ABSTRACT
This Article studies regulatory strategies to address the potential systemic
risk of hedge fund operation in financial markets. Due to the implications of
the choice of regulatory strategies and instruments in terms of mitigating systemic risk, the Article focuses on one critical aspect of hedge fund regulation, namely the choice between direct regulation and indirect regulation.
This Article defines the distinction between direct and indirect regulation,
maps this distinction’s implications in terms of regulatory techniques and
instruments, and analyzes the arguments for and against direct and indirect
regulation of hedge funds. This Article argues that the indirect regulation
of hedge funds through their counterparties and creditors is not only less
costly but also can better address regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds and
their potential contribution to systemic risk. The economic and organizational structure of hedge funds and their particular features in terms of the
number and composition of their counterparties and creditors support this
policy recommendation.
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INTRODUCTION
Carl J. Loomis first coined the term “hedge fund” in an article from
1966 discussing the structure and investment strategies of the investment
vehicle that Alfred W. Jones originally created in 1949.1 Prior to the regulatory reforms following the global financial crisis, there was no statutory definition of hedge funds.2 Indeed, hedge funds were essentially the product of
statutory and regulatory exemptions and negatively defined by reference to
what they were not, rather than to what they were.3 Although searching for a
definition that is adequately inclusive and sufficiently exclusive of all aspects
of hedge funds seems to be a futile endeavor, a working definition is necessary to study them further. As a working definition, a hedge fund is an investment vehicle that is privately organized,4 with a specific fee structure,5
1

Carol J. Loomis, The Jones Nobody Keeps Up With, FORTUNE MAG., Apr. 1966, at 237.
However, the U.S. Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010 (the
Private Fund Act) introduces the concept of “private fund,” which is defined in 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-2(a)(29) (2012). A hedge fund is a subcategory of private funds that is defined in 12
U.S.C. § 1851(h)(2) (2012). The Private Fund Act follows the path of its predecessors and
defines hedge funds by what they are not, rather than by what they are. Both this act and its
counterpart in Europe, the Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive (AIFMD), are
criticized for failing to create a clear distinction between hedge funds and other similar funds
such as private equity funds. See, e.g., Jennifer Payne, Private Equity and Its Regulation
in Europe, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 559, 584 (2011); see also Jacob Rothschild, Europe
Is Getting It Wrong on Financial Reform, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.ft.com/intl
/cms/s/0/f51bdb9a-4caa-11df-9977-00144feab49a.html#axzz3C9rILAgI. The SEC recently
offered a more functional and substantive definition of hedge funds for the purposes of the
Form PF. It defined hedge funds in terms of their performance fee, high leverage, and short
selling. See Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity
Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, Release No. IA-3308, 76
Fed. Reg. 71127 (Nov. 16, 2011). Since the complexity and dynamics of financial institutions do not lend themselves to a per genus et differentiam definition, searching for an
all-encompassing definition which is adequately inclusive and sufficiently exclusive of each
and every aspect of hedge funds seems to be a futile endeavor. See H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 13-16 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that however precise a definition may be,
there will be unavoidable borderline issues). McBarnet also argues that the laws resting
upon definitions and criteria involving clear rules and thresholds are prone to legal
engineering and regulatory arbitrage. Doreen McBarnet, Financial Engineering or Legal
Engineering? Legal Work, Legal Integrity and the Banking Crisis, THE FUTURE OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION 72–73 (Iain G. MacNeil & Justin O’Brien eds., 2010).
3
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also GORDON DE
BROUWER, HEDGE FUNDS IN EMERGING MARKETS 10 (2001).
4
Hedge funds’ legal structure mainly takes the form of a limited liability partnership
(LLP) or a limited liability company (LLC). Dan Barufaldi, Hedge Funds: Structures,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/university/hedge-fund/structures.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
5
A typical hedge fund charges 2 percent of the net asset value under management as
management fee and 20 percent of the profits as performance or incentive fee. Certain highwater marks and hurdle rates may also apply. Id.
2
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not widely available to the public,6 aimed at generating absolute returns irrespective of the market movements (alpha)7 through active trading,8 that
makes use of a variety of trading strategies.
Hedge funds provide several benefits to financial markets. They are
sources of diversification9 and liquidity.10 Furthermore, by investing in “less
liquid, more complex and hard-to-value” securities such as convertible
bonds, distressed debt, and credit default swaps, hedge funds complete and
deepen financial markets.11 More importantly, hedge funds’ focus on generating alpha (the excess return of a hedge fund relative to a benchmark return)
is rooted in exploiting market imperfections and discrepancies,12 which
6

In the U.S., the recently enacted Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act directs
the SEC to amend rule 506 of the Regulation D to remove the ban on hedge fund general
solicitation. H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (Jan. 3, 2012). However, the sale of hedge fund products is still restricted to accredited investors. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(e)(B) (2012).
7
The excess return of a hedge fund relative to a benchmark index is called its alpha. See
Arturo Neto, Quantitative Analysis of Hedge Funds, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia
.com/articles/mutualfund/09/hedge-fundanalysis.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). Simply put,
the alpha shows by how much a hedge fund outperforms the markets, which can serve as
a measurement of managerial skill. See William A. Roach, Jr., Hedge Fund Regulation:
“What Side of the Hedges Are You on?”, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 165, 166–69, 208 (2009)
(arguing that generation of alpha is one of the significant features of hedge funds).
8
J.S. AIKMAN, WHEN PRIME BROKERS FAIL: THE UNHEEDED RISK TO HEDGE FUNDS,
BANKS, AND THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY 90 (2010) (highlighting the fact that investment in
hedge funds is often illiquid and may only be redeemed intermittently). Prior to the introduction of post-crisis financial regulation, the absence of a registration requirement and
legal restraints on hedge funds’ investment strategies were among the defining features of
hedge funds. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE
FUNDS 13–14, 77 (2003) [hereinafter IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS],
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf; see also Houman B.
Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor
Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 245 (2009) (viewing the unrestrained use of investment strategies as a defining feature of a hedge fund).
9
Wouter van Eechoud et al., Future Regulation of Hedge Funds—A Systemic Risk
Perspective, 19 FIN. MARKETS, INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS 269, 275–78 (2010); see also
William F. Sharpe, Asset Allocation: Management Style and Performance Measurement,
18 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 7, 7–19 (1992) (arguing that hedge funds provide diversification
for professional and institutional investors); Thomas Schneeweis et al., Alternative Investments in the Institutional Portfolio 1, 2–3, 9–10 (Mar. 2002) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.edge-fund.com/ScKG02.pdf.
10
Robert J. Bianchi & Michael E. Drew, Hedge Fund Regulation and Systemic Risk,
19 GRIFFITH L. REV. 6, 13–15 (2010).
11
Eechoud et al., supra note 9, at 275–78; Bianchi & Drew, supra note 10, at 13–15.
12
In fact, the lack of legal restrictions on the use of financial instruments, strategies,
and investment concentration of hedge funds enables them to use a wide range of techniques to exploit market imperfections. See Hossein Nabilou, Global Governance of
Financial Institutions and Regulatory Arbitrage: The Case of Hedge Funds 6, n.7
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facilitates the price discovery mechanism in financial markets by eroding
arbitrage opportunities.13 In addition, hedge funds are considered contrarian
position takers14 in financial markets.15 The mechanisms used to lock up
capital in hedge funds (such as gates and side-pocket arrangements)16 enable them to further sustain their contrarian positions.17 Such a function can
potentially smooth market volatility and reduce the number and magnitude
of asset price bubbles.18 Partly because of all these benefits, some argue
that markets have become more resilient in times of distress since the
emergence of hedge funds as major market participants.19
(Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Working Paper, 2013), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2323379.
13
Some hedge funds specialized in equity market neutral or statistical arbitrage focus
on exploiting price differences between highly similar or identical securities listed on different exchanges. They might even attempt to exploit the price differences between individual
stocks and their indices. In doing so, they not only make money for themselves, but also they
increase the efficiency of the markets by eroding those price discrepancies. See AIKMAN,
supra note 8, at 78; Andrew Crockett, The Evolution and Regulation of Hedge Funds, 10
FIN. STABILITY REV. 19, 22. (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.banque-france.fr/file
admin/user_upload/banque_de_france/publications/Revue_de_la_stabilite_financiere/etud2
_0407.pdf; see also Roach, Jr., supra note 7, at 173.
14
Contrarian position taking means taking a position contrary to that of other mainstream financial institutions. Definition of contrarian, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com
/Term?term=contrarian (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). For example, when some financial institutions are taking long positions on certain securities, the contrarians go short on them.
15
Andrew Ang et al., Hedge Fund Leverage, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 102, 103, 121 (2011).
16
To prevent a run on hedge funds, hedge fund managers usually use gates or gate
provisions, which are restrictions on hedge fund investors’ redemption rights that are intended to limit the amount of withdrawals from the fund during a redemption period. Gate
Provision, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gateprovision.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). Side pocket arrangements are mechanisms to segregate parts of a
hedge fund’s assets to be invested in illiquid and hard-to-value projects or investments.
Side Pocket, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sidepocket.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). The assets allocated to the side pockets cannot be redeemed unless
the returns on the projects or investments are realized or they become liquid marketable
securities again. Id.
17
Crockett, supra note 13, at 22.
18
Eechoud et al., supra note 9, at 275–78.
19
Roger T. Cole et al., Hedge Funds, Credit Risk Transfer and Financial Stability, 10
FIN. STABILITY REV. 7, 11–12 (Apr. 2007). Although the severity of the recent financial
crisis and the collapse of several hedge funds during the crisis shed substantial doubts on
these claims, evidence suggests that many other hedge funds were launched to profit from
price dislocations in securitized markets during the crisis. See, e.g., LLOYD DIXON ET AL.,
HEDGE FUNDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK 47–49 (2012). Most commentators agree that hedge
funds provide a significant stabilizing influence by providing liquidity and spreading risk
across a broad range of investors. See, e.g., Jean-Pierre Mustier & Alain Dubois, Risks
and Return of Banking Activities Related to Hedge Funds, 10 FIN. STABILITY REV. 85,
88–89 (2007).
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Despite their benefits, hedge funds can pose risks to financial systems
and contribute to financial instability. Although their role in financial instability is highly contested,20 hedge funds’ size and leverage, their interconnectedness with Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs), and the
likelihood of hedge funds’ herding can undermine financial stability. The
data on hedge funds’ size21 and leverage22 show that these features are far
from being systemically important. Nevertheless, empirical evidence on
hedge fund interconnectedness and herding23 is mixed, and it remains a
major concern for regulators.24
Given the potential risks that hedge funds pose to the financial system,
this Article aims to determine which regulatory strategies can best address
these risks with the least impairment to the benefits hedge funds offer to
financial markets. Direct and indirect regulations are two main regulatory
20

Nicolas Papageorgiou & Florent Salmon, The Role of Hedge Funds in the Banking
Crisis: Victim Or Culprit, in THE BANKING CRISIS HANDBOOK 183, 184, 199–200 (Greg
N. Gregoriou ed., 2010).
21
Data on hedge funds demonstrate that they are relatively modest in size compared
with mainstream financial institutions. An estimate of the hedge fund industry’s size in
March 2012 indicates that hedge fund industry’s assets under management (AUM) amount
to $2.55 trillion. CITI PRIME FIN., HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY SNAPSHOT 3–4 (2012). Consistent with the industry’s modest size, hedge fund liquidation had a very limited impact
on financial markets overall. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks
Delivered at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference:
Hedge Funds: Creators of Risk (May 16, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20060516a.htm).
22
Hedge fund leverage is significantly less than that of depository institutions, listed
investment banks, and broker dealers. See Anurag Gupta & Bing Liang, Do Hedge Funds
Have Enough Capital? A Value-at-Risk Approach, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 219, 236, 248 (2005).
See also Ang et al., supra note 15, at 121.
23
Herding happens when funds mimic other funds or financial institutions while their
own private information or proprietary models suggest other behavior. See Christopher
Avery & Peter Zemsky, Multidimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behavior in Financial
Markets, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 724, 726, 740 (1998) (arguing that herd behavior occurs due
to asymmetric information among traders or investors when trades are sequential. Although
standard economic theory based on the efficient market hypothesis would claim that the
price mechanism assures that the long-run choices are optimal and the herd behavior is
impossible, the driving force behind herd behavior is that in an imperfect or asymmetric
information setting, people may rationally take into account the information revealed or
signals sent by others’ action.).
24
Nicole M. Boyson, Christof W. Stahel & René M. Stulz, Hedge Fund Contagion
and Liquidity Shocks, 65 J. FIN. 1789, 1814 (2010). Fung and Hsieh also found evidence
of hedge fund herding in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis and the
Asian Crisis; however, they could find little evidence of a systematic causal relationship between hedge funds’ behavior and deviation of market prices from economic fundamentals
that could be attributed to the hedge fund industry. See William Fung & David A. Hsieh,
Measuring the Market Impact of Hedge Funds, 7 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 1, 34–35 (2000).
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strategies to address such a problem and balance hedge funds’ benefits and
risks.25
Differences of opinion about hedge fund regulation after the global financial crisis highlighted these two strategies. On the one hand, United
States and United Kingdom regulators, along with the hedge fund industry
itself, supported the indirect regulation of hedge funds through regulated
banks.26 On the other hand, regulators in continental Europe supported a
more direct regulatory framework for hedge funds.27 The ultimate outcome
of the clash of these two opposing views was a compromise.28 One of the
catalysts for this compromise was the increasingly stringent attitude in the
U.S. towards hedge fund regulation after the change of administration, that
is, the replacement of Republicans by Democrats in 2008.29 The change of
regulatory policy in the U.S. paved the way for at least a partial realization
of the European views on hedge fund regulation.30 In the end, the efforts to
rein in hedge funds culminated in the G20 London Summit in April 2009,
at which all parties agreed that hedge funds and their advisers should be
subject to mandatory registration and disclosure requirements.31
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. First, we introduce the distinction between direct and indirect regulation. Second, we
25

Direct regulation involves regulatory measures focusing on the regulation of the
industry itself as a discrete activity, targeting hedge funds’ structure, strategies, and operations. See PHOEBUS ATHANASSIOU, HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 227 (2009). It often employs registration, disclosure, capital requirements, and position limits as regulatory instruments. Id. In contrast,
indirect regulation involves “market discipline-inspired regulatory measures targeting the
creditors and counterparties of hedge funds.” Id. The key element of indirect regulation is
the regulator’s reliance on market participants to harness market discipline. Id. Indirect regulation also employs incentive-compatible economic instruments in contrast to commandand-control regulatory instruments, which are mostly employed in direct regulation. Id.
26
See Eric Helleiner & Stefano Pagliari, The End of Self Regulation? Hedge Funds and
Derivatives in Global Financial Governance, in GLOBAL FINANCE IN CRISIS: THE POLITICS
OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CHANGE 74, 75–76 (Eric Helleiner, Stefano Pagliari, &
Hubert Zimmerman eds., 2010).
27
Accusations of abusive short selling by hedge funds in the time of crisis deepened
this divergence of opinion. See Eilís Ferran, After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge
Funds and Private Equity in the EU, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 379, 389 (2011). On the
other hand, the national elections in France and Germany, giving rise to the coalition of
these two countries for regulating hedge funds, led to the expansion of regulatory turf of
the EU institutions. See UK Suffers Hedge Fund Blow, FIN. TIMES (May 13, 2010), http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f583a770-5ed4-11df-af86-00144feab49a.html#axzz3Di2 RGLQ5
(demonstrating the effectiveness of Franco-German cooperation).
28
Ferran, supra note 27, at 390–93 (2011).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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analyze the arguments for and against direct and indirect regulation of
hedge funds. Finally, we highlight the advantages of indirect regulation in
addressing and mitigating the potential contribution of hedge funds to
systemic risk.
I. REGULATORY STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR
HEDGE FUND REGULATION
Hasty responses to financial crises often leave behind many unanswered, yet important, questions. Not surprisingly, this was the case in the
post-crisis financial regulatory reforms.32 These reforms changed the overall landscape of the hedge fund industry and its relationship with the rest
of the financial system, leaving many questions unanswered. One of these
questions concerned the overarching issue of choosing the appropriate regulatory strategy to regulate hedge funds—that is, the choice between direct
regulation and indirect regulation.
Using law to create behavioral change can be done directly or indirectly.
Direct or entity regulation involves regulatory measures focusing immediately on the regulation of the target industry as a “discrete activity or as
part of the broader, regulated investment services universe.”33 In contrast,
indirect regulation utilizes an intermediary to transmit the imperatives or
commands to the (primarily intended) regulated entity or activity that is
ultimately the target.34 Direct regulation mainly relies on the threat of law
by using command-and-control regulatory instruments,35 whereas indirect
32

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1782, 1785, 1815, 1821 (2011); see also Roberta
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114
YALE L.J. 1521, 1524, 1526, 1602 (2005).
33
ATHANASSIOU, supra note 25, at 227.
34
Id. at 227–28, 234.
35
Command-and-control instruments are the most traditional methods of effecting a
behavioral change in the subjects of regulation. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 18–37 (2001). A command is “an order backed by threats.”
Id. Therefore, the non-compliance or violation of such an order triggers coercive sanctions on the part of the state. Id. In this method of regulation, the law uses traditional rules
to further certain policy objectives. Id. Some literature classifies the distinction between
command-and-control instruments and economic instruments as imperium and dominium.
See T. Daintith, The Techniques of Government, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 209,
213–18 (Jowell & Oliver eds., 1994). Daintith uses the term imperium when the government uses the command of law in pursuit of policy objectives such as setting a standard
or rule for the behavior of intended entities and providing sanctions for non-compliance. He
also uses the term dominium when government deploys its wealth for such purposes. Id.
For an illustration of the distinction between imperium and dominium, see Spencer Zifcak,
Contractualism, Democracy and Ethics, 60 AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMIN. 86, 93–96 (2001).
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regulation mostly relies on economic instruments with the aim of harnessing market discipline.36
II. DIRECT REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
Direct measures targeting the entity itself impose requirements on hedge
funds’ structure, strategies, and operations. Examples of mechanisms used
to directly regulate hedge funds include, inter alia, mandatory registration,
mandatory disclosure, limitations on the size or the leverage of the fund,
and restrictions for leveraged funds (for example, capital adequacy requirements), remuneration restrictions, limits on liquidity management, restrictions on investment in securitization positions, and rules and requirements
for valuation.37
The primary question with respect to the indirect regulation of hedge
funds is whether such a regulatory strategy is necessary. When regulatory
measures such as those proposed above can be directly implemented and
applied to the regulated entity without an intermediary, the need for indirect regulation of hedge funds by using regulatory intermediaries must be
justified.38 In order to justify such a far-fetched choice, the shortcomings of
direct regulatory measures in addressing hedge funds’ potential systemic risks
should be identified and a case should be made for the capacity of indirect
regulation to counterbalance the shortcomings of direct regulatory measures.
The most compelling argument against the direct regulation of hedge
funds is that direct regulation focusing on these entities and imposing restrictions on their activities is likely to undermine hedge funds’ benefits to
36

The roots of the distinction between command-and-control and economic instruments
can originally be found in the literature on legal origins. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 25–31 (5th ed. 1998). La Porta et al. show that countries
with civil and common law traditions demonstrate different regulatory styles. See Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of
Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 285–86, 293, 305, 326 (2008). Looking
through the same lens, Ogus identifies the tension between two systems of economic organization within the industrialized countries, the “market system” and “collectivist system.”
See ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 15 (2004). Ogus
mainly associates the market system with private, facilitative, and decentralized law, while
in collectivist systems, the state encourages behavior, which would not occur in the absence of state intervention, to correct market failures and achieve collective goals. Id. See
also Anthony Ogus, Comparing Regulatory Systems: Institutions, Processes and Legal
Forms in Industrialised Countries, in LEADING ISSUES IN COMPETITION, REGULATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 145–49 (Paul Cook et al. ed., 2004).
37
See generally IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 8
(discussing a wide range of hedge fund regulations past and present).
38
In other words, in the presence of direct regulation, how can an additional layer of
regulators, which, in and of itself, involves an additional level of agency costs, be justified?
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financial markets while not being effective against the negative externalities
that hedge funds can potentially impose on the financial system. Imposing
a disclosure requirement on hedge funds is an example of how such regulations can be ineffective or even counterproductive. Although disclosure
and transparency requirements seem necessary for harnessing market discipline,39 their imposition on hedge funds may create several unintended
consequences. First, these requirements can lead to a false sense of protection among hedge fund investors and counterparties40 because those investors could assume that regulation has made hedge funds safer simply
by imposing disclosure requirements on them.41 Second, the indiscriminate imposition of disclosure requirements on hedge funds can potentially
increase strategy correlations and the risk of herd behavior by increasing
the possibility that hedge funds and financial institutions will copy the
strategies of other hedge funds.42 Third, imposing disclosure requirements
may also expose hedge funds to certain market risks such as the risk of a
short squeeze.43
39

For example, one of the sources of market discipline is banks. Before providing
financing to hedge funds or engaging in derivative transactions with a hedge fund, banks
have to perform a credit assessment. Cole et al., supra note 19, at 11–12. In doing so, banks
employ a “scorecard approach” in which the bank rates the fund based on its “management,
leverage, risk measurement, liquidity, and strategy.” Id. Because these assessments are
based on the information disclosed by hedge funds, transparency can play a significant
role in that process. Id. Without adequate transparency, it is almost impossible for a bank
to perform such an assessment. Id. Although the evidence is mixed, it appears that there
are some areas in which market discipline exerts itself. Id.
40
Jón Daníelsson & Jean-Pierre Zigrand, Regulating Hedge Funds, 10 FIN.
STABILITY REV. 29, 30 (Apr. 2007).
41
This effect is best explained by the placebo effect of law. The placebo effect of a
law “manipulates individuals’ expectations regarding a risk that the law addresses.”
Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54, 57 (2006). We will return to the placebo effect of law later in
this Article.
42
Informational cascades have long been identified as sources of volatility of mass
behavior (herding). See Robert J. Shiller, Conversation, Information, and Herd Behavior,
85 AM. ECON. REV. 181, 181–82 (1995).
43
FRANÇOIS-SERGE LHABITANT, HANDBOOK OF HEDGE FUNDS 33 (2006). In order to
take a short position, the trader usually borrows securities from a dealer and sells them in
the market with the expectation that price of the securities will be lower at certain point in
the future, at which time the trader will buy them back and return them to the dealer.
Short (or Short Position), INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/short.asp
(last visited Nov. 19, 2014). By doing so, the short seller pockets the difference between
the higher sale price and the lower purchase price at which he has bought them back and
returned them to the dealer. However, “short squeeze” occurs when, contrary to the expectations of the short sellers, the stock price of the security being shorted actually increases.
Short Squeeze, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortsqueeze.asp (last
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Lastly, the contribution of hedge funds to market efficiency essentially
depends on their ability to maintain the secrecy of proprietary information
underlying their investment strategies. Imposing the disclosure of proprietary information can substantially reduce hedge funds’ investment in acquiring proprietary information, which is the main venue through which they
can exploit market imperfections and contribute to market efficiency.44
Another instance of an unintended consequence of the direct regulation
of hedge funds can be seen in the imposition of leverage restrictions or capital requirements on their balance sheets. The theoretically unlimited leverage
capacity of hedge funds enables them to take contrarian positions in distressed markets, thereby smoothing the adverse effects of financial shocks.
Due to the pro-cyclicality of capital requirements,45 in times of market distress, most financial institutions facing leverage constraints are likely to deleverage and possibly cause fire sales and asset price downward spirals.46
Hedge funds, however, can step in and buy the assets. This function can mitigate and smooth the effects of shocks to asset prices in distressed markets,47
but leverage requirements would most likely undermine the beneficial contribution of hedge funds to the stability of financial markets.
visited Nov. 19, 2014). In that case, since short sellers are vulnerable to unlimited losses,
they might rush to purchase the securities to be returned to the dealer. The very rush to purchase the securities also contributes to a further increase in their price. Imposing disclosure requirements on hedge fund positions will inform their competitors of their positions
and make them strategically vulnerable to short squeeze, particularly if the short position
is taken on securities with limited liquidity or on securities of a company with few outstanding securities.
44
To address these problems, Luigi Zingales proposes delayed information disclosure
by hedge funds. He further suggests that delayed disclosure can help reduce the competitive
costs of disclosure which can be incurred due to the positive externalities of information
disclosure. See Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation, 47 J. ACCT. RES., 391,
393 (2009). However, the pace at which hedge funds’ positions are adjusted would limit
the usefulness of the delayed information disclosure, which renders it useless in the ex ante
assessment of the systemic risk.
45
Henrik Andersen, Procyclical Implications of Basel II: Can the Cyclicality of
Capital Requirements Be Contained?, 7 J. FIN. STABILITY 138, 139, 147–48 (2011). Regulation can be procyclical if it amplifies financial market fluctuations. Id. For example, riskbased capital requirements are procyclical because they essentially require banks to increase
their capital when their portfolio risk rises. Id. Raising the level of capital, especially in the
downturn, can limit the supply of credit and aggravate a credit crunch, which can further
contribute to financial instability. Id.
46
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A
Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN. 1343, 1345, 1355, 1364 (1992).
47
In addition, one of the main benefits of hedge funds is the provision of liquidity in
niche markets such as the market for exotic derivatives. Imposing leverage caps on hedge
funds can dry up liquidity in such markets.
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Overall, there are three primary reasons why the direct regulation of
hedge funds may fail to achieve the intended goals: (1) direct regulation encourages regulatory arbitrage; (2) it creates legal placebo effects in hedge
funds’ counterparties and investors; and (3) the one-size-fits-all measures
typical of direct regulation cannot adequately address the wide diversity
and heterogeneity of hedge funds and their strategies.
A. Direct Regulation and Regulatory Arbitrage by Hedge Funds
Direct regulation, which primarily involves rules-based regulation resting upon statutory definitions, is typically exposed to regulatory arbitrage.48
The degree to which a firm engages in regulatory arbitrage, however, is a
function of the private costs and benefits of regulation and the existence of
alternative regulatory regimes available to the firm. Assuming two alternative
regulatory regimes and zero switching costs, a firm facing marginal costs of
a regulatory regime “A” that exceed its marginal benefits will tend to locate
its business in jurisdiction “B” where the marginal benefits of regulation
exceed its marginal costs.49
To reduce the likelihood of regulatory arbitrage, an incentive-compatible
mechanism should contain countervailing benefits offsetting the costs of
regulation incurred by financial institutions. The most important countervailing benefit for regulatory costs that can be offered to financial firms is enhanced reputation.50 For example, the financial institutions regulated by the
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS)
Directive in Europe can better market and sell their products if they show
to their customers that they are UCITS-compliant. However, we will argue
that the potential benefits from regulation are not evenly distributed across
all types of financial institutions. Mainly because of the reputational effects
of regulation, regulation-induced benefits are valued more by mainstream
financial firms that deal with retail customers than by hedge funds. Therefore, hedge fund regulation is less likely to be effective in dissuading them
from regulatory arbitrage.
We are going to discuss the costs and the benefits of regulatory arbitrage
from the perspective of a typical hedge fund. We will start with definitional
48

Regulatory arbitrage essentially “exploits the gap between the economic substance
of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment.” See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory
Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010). Such exploitation is possible due to the
“legal system’s intrinsically limited ability to attach formal labels that track the economics
of transactions with sufficient precision.” Id.
49
Id. at 246–47, 275–76.
50
Id. at 265–69.
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problems in hedge fund regulation that make the costs of regulatory arbitrage relatively low. Then, we will emphasize the uneven and asymmetric
distribution of reputational benefits for hedge funds as opposed to other
mainstream financial firms. Finally, we will analyze the overall role of
direct regulation in encouraging regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds.
1. Definitional Problems and Regulatory Arbitrage by Hedge Funds
For years, hedge fund regulation has been thwarted by definitional problems, the crux of which was the U.S. Circuit Court decision in Goldstein v.
SEC.51 These definitional problems are one of the main reasons for legal
engineering and regulatory arbitrage.52 Regulatory arbitrage essentially
“exploits the gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its
legal or regulatory treatment.”53 Such exploitation is made possible due to
the “legal system’s intrinsically limited ability to attach formal labels that
track the economics of transactions with sufficient precision.”54
In addition to the inherent indeterminacy in language,55 the prospective
generalizations, which are necessary features of law,56 are another source of
indeterminacy and vagueness in statutory definitions and subsequent interpretations. Regardless of how precise and determinate a rule is, the limits of
human foresight imply that even the least vague terms may become vague
upon their application to a particular situation that was not predictable
when the rule was made.57 Therefore, “a rule ... is only as good as its interpretation.”58 In this sense, the choice of a particular method of interpretation in financial regulation, enforcement, and adjudication can significantly
affect the problems arising from boundaries set out by statutory definitions
in financial markets.
This limited linguistic ability coupled with problems of interpretation
breed opportunities in which the technical compliance with rules and regulations can be achieved while undermining the underlying justifications on
which the entire regulatory system or a specific law is predicated. Compliance of this sort, dubbed “creative compliance,” which essentially involves
51

See 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
McBarnet, supra note 2, at 72.
53
Fleischer, supra note 48, at 229.
54
Id.
55
HART, supra note 2, at 126.
56
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 214–18 (2d
ed. 2009).
57
JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS 12–13 (1997).
58
Id. at 13.
52
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“using the law to escape legal control without actually violating legal
rules,”59 is well documented in the regulation literature.60
Aside from the intrinsic limited ability of legal systems to capture the
substance and the economics of transactions, another source of regulatory
arbitrage is associated with “legal formalism.”61 Legal formalism, not recognizing the “necessity of choice in penumbral areas of rules,”62 follows
the letter of a rule, even if this fails to serve its purpose.63 The emphasis on
literal interpretation and legal formalism highlights the role of definitions
in legislation, rule-making and adjudication. Needless to say, contrary to
the principles-based regulation the focus of which is on “goals” rather than
“means” of achieving the goals, rules-based regulation creates vast opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.64 Likewise, rules-based direct regulation of
hedge funds along with the appeal to the literal meaning of words in adjudication and legal interpretation can be used to undermine the very purpose
of regulation designed to address hedge funds’ externalities.
Accordingly, the necessity for interpretation implies that regulators’
reliance on definitions is not necessarily helpful, and in fact can be counterproductive. In the words of Judge Randolph, in Goldstein v. SEC, “[t]he
lack of statutory definition of a word does not necessarily render the meaning of a word ambiguous, just as the presence of a definition does not necessarily make the meaning clear. A definition only pushes the problem back
to the meaning of the defining terms.”65 Therefore, the direct regulation of
hedge funds that cannot avoid using statutory definitions is unlikely to cope
with regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds.
Regardless of the subjects of rules and regulations, all types of regulation necessarily involve definitions and, to a certain degree, are subject to
regulatory arbitrage. In other words, a direct regulation relying on precise
rules and definitions spurs regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds as much as
it encourages regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds’ counterparties and
creditors. As we will argue in the next two Sections, however, the costs of
regulatory arbitrage for hedge funds are substantially lower compared to
59

Doreen McBarnet & Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism
and the Struggle for Legal Control, 54 MOD. L. REV. 848 (1991).
60
See KAREN YEUNG, SECURING COMPLIANCE: A PRINCIPLED APPROACH 3–4 (2004).
61
HART, supra note 2, at 129.
62
Id. at 124–30.
63
McBarnet and Whelan define formalism as “a narrow approach to legal control—
the use of clearly defined, highly administrable rules, an emphasis on uniformity, consistency and predictability, on the legal form of transactions and relationships and on literal
interpretation.” See McBarnet & Whelan, supra note 59, at 848–49.
64
McBarnet, supra note 2, at 72.
65
See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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the costs for banks and mutual funds. Therefore, regulating hedge funds
through, for instance, the banks they deal with is less likely to encourage
regulatory arbitrage.
Taking all the above-mentioned problems with definitions into account,
it is not surprising to observe a consistent tendency of regulators to avoid
engaging in definitional issues in hedge fund regulation, especially those
concerning a hedge fund as an entity.66 The hassles in defining dynamic and
heterogeneous entities such as hedge funds give rise to problems that make
direct regulation difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Indeed, regulatory arbitrage is the main obstacle for a rules-based direct regulation of hedge
funds. Such problems can be better addressed by using principles-based
regulation or even indirect regulation, which, as discussed above, focuses
on financial entities other than hedge funds themselves.
2. Hedge Funds’ Closure Rate and Reputational Costs of
Regulatory Arbitrage
There are limits to regulatory arbitrage, and market forces can, to some
extent, mitigate the effects of the regulatory race-to-the-bottom that may
stem from such a practice.67 Indeed, a firm’s ability to arbitrage between
66

Entity-based approach to regulation or institutional regulation has its own proponents
because the problem of definition is ubiquitous in the regulation of economic activities
and is not limited to institution-based financial regulation. See Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap
Agreements Securities or Futures?: The Inadequacies of Applying the Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC Derivatives Transactions, 24 J. CORP. L. 379 (1999). In other
words, definitional problems also pose almost the same challenges to the “product-based
approach” to regulation. Id. at 416 (showing how regulation of swap agreements can escape
regulation because there is uncertainty and complexities in defining financial products such
as securities and futures. She concludes that, concerning swap markets, the regulatory problems such as definitional and jurisdictional problems can best be addressed by focusing
on the “market participant-based regulation” rather than the classification of swap agreements as futures or securities.). However, with respect to hedge fund regulation, most
regulations opted for an institutional one-size-fits-all regulation for “alternative investment funds” or “private funds.”
67
Race-to-the-bottom occurs when there are competing regulatory jurisdictions, and as
a result of competitive pressures, the competitors subscribe to the lowest standards, perhaps to lower compliance costs and attract more businesses to increase its tax base. See
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 906 (1998). Such a phenomenon
can best be explained by strategic non-cooperative interactions forming a prisoners’ dilemma
in which every jurisdiction has a greater incentive to defect. However, as suggested above,
competitive pressures do not necessarily result in a race-to-the-bottom. Id. at 916–17.
Indeed, empirical evidence confirms the theory that regulatory competition will result in a
separation between countries based on their securities regulatory system. Id. Some jurisdictions will cater to managers seeking opportunistic behavior and some others will attract
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regulatory regimes is constrained by its willingness to be subject to the least
credible regulatory regime. Financial institutions’ willingness to choose a
less credible regulatory regime is, among other things, a function of their
investors’ and counterparties’ willingness to engage in transactions with
financial institutions supported by a stable and reliable financial infrastructure.68 Therefore, if because of reputational concerns the quality of
regulation matters for financial institutions, regulatory arbitrage will occur
only to a limited extent.
Recent empirical studies on banks’ regulatory arbitrage find strong evidence of transfer of funds by banks to less regulated markets.69 Meanwhile,
these studies confirm that in the absence of a strong institutional infrastructure and of a legal environment supporting strong property and creditor’s
rights, the lax regulation by itself is not sufficient to give rise to massive
capital flows from more regulated to less regulated jurisdictions, because a
strong banking regulation may serve as a “signal of quality and stability.”70
These studies conclude that the relevance of the quality of financial regulation mitigates the concerns for regulatory arbitrage.71 Thus, the quality of
regulation is of crucial importance because reputation-enhancing regulation
is less prone to regulatory arbitrage than regulation that is anti-competitive,
such as regulation imposing interest rate ceilings on loans.72
In addition, the importance of regulation-induced reputation for different financial firms is asymmetric. In other words, the arguments for regulation as a signal of quality may matter more to some firms, such as banks,
than to others, such as hedge funds. There are two reasons for such a differential impact of regulation-induced reputation on firms’ regulatory arbitrage
behavior. The first reason lies in hedge funds’ idiosyncratic nature and special attributes. The second reason is the relative opaqueness of hedge funds.
Reputational concerns constitute the most important consideration discouraging firms from taking refuge in less credible financial jurisdictions
managers/issuers seeking to signal credibility and quality. Id. at 950–51. Investors and companies will identify themselves accordingly by registering with those regulators. Id. In turn,
a rational investor will discount for investing in bad quality issuers offsetting the risk of
opportunistic behavior. Id. See also RICHARD J. HERRING & ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAL
REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 5, 131 (1995) (arguing that the competitive threat
to the U.S. banking system from offshore financial centers in the US dollar deposit market
is limited by reputational considerations).
68
KERN ALEXANDER ET AL., GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 10–12 (2006).
69
Joel F. Houston, Chen Lin & Yue Ma, Regulatory Arbitrage and International
Bank Flows, 67 J. FIN. 1845, 1847 (2012).
70
Id. at 1848.
71
Id.
72
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 68, at 12.
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or shifting their businesses to less regulated financial sectors within one
jurisdiction.73 Repeated interactions are a prerequisite for the emergence
of evolutionary cooperation based on trust and reputation.74 Limited future
interactions, however, breed opportunistic behavior.75 In the hedge fund
industry, limited transparency and the transient nature of hedge funds that
arises from extraordinarily higher closure rate among them76 undermine the
importance of regulation-induced reputation. In contrast, commercial and
investment banks, mutual funds, and other mainstream financial institutions
with lower closure rates often have multi-dimensional financial relationships
with other market participants and regulators.77 The prospect of long-term
interactions creates much stronger reputational effects for these institutions, reducing their incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior.
Unlike other financial institutions, hedge funds often have a onedimensional business prospect focused on the maximization of returns
from trading.78 Therefore, they are much less constrained by long-term
business interests. In addition, while other mainstream financial institutions have limits on their portfolio concentration and should comply with
certain portfolio diversification policies, there is no limit to hedge funds’
portfolio concentration.79 In the absence of such limits, hedge funds can
take large positions in certain individual markets or even individual assets.
Because hedge funds are active traders, they can also change these positions very quickly. The risk that they act opportunistically stems precisely
from these circumstances.80
In conclusion, it seems that hedge funds are less concerned about reputation than their counterparties. More precisely, the importance of regulationinduced reputation in the decision to engage in regulatory arbitrage is of less
73

Id.
Id.
75
Id.
76
It is estimated that the average life span of a hedge fund is forty months. Sixty percent of hedge funds disappear within three years and fewer than fifteen percent of hedge
funds last longer than six years. See Michael R. King & Philip Maier, Hedge Funds and
Financial Stability: Regulating Prime Brokers Will Mitigate Systemic Risks, 5 J. FIN.
STABILITY 283, 286 (2009); see also Stephen J. Brown, William N. Goetzmann & Roger
G. Ibbotson, Offshore Hedge Funds: Survival and Performance, 1989–95, 72 J. BUS. 91,
91–93 (1999); Burton G. Malkiel & Atanu Saha, Hedge Funds: Risk and Return, 61 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 80, 82–84 (2005).
77
House of Representatives of Australia, Hedge Funds, Financial Stability and Market
Integrity 5 (June, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at www.rba.gov.au/publications
/submissions/hdge-fnds-mkt-stab/pdf/hdge-fnds-mkt-stab.pdf.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
74
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concern for hedge funds than for more established and reputation-sensitive
mainstream financial institutions, such as commercial and investment
banks, mutual funds, and pension funds. This circumstance undermines
the effectiveness of the direct regulation of hedge funds.
3. Transparency, Reputational Costs, and Regulatory Arbitrage by
Hedge Funds
The second difference between hedge funds and other mainstream financial institutions with respect to regulatory arbitrage is that the mainstream firms are subject to mandatory disclosure to investors and regulators.
Until recently, hedge funds operated under a voluntary disclosure system.
Under a voluntary system of disclosure, regulation cannot enhance reputation and therefore cannot inhibit regulatory arbitrage.
It is argued that even in unregulated markets, high performing firms have
incentive to disclose in order to signal quality and differentiate themselves
from poorly performing firms.81 However, the main obstacle to the voluntary
provision of the optimal level of information is the problem of externalities.82
The law and economics literature has shown that disclosure, even when
socially optimal, may not be privately optimal.83 Similar to the problem of
commons or “impure public goods” nature of information,84 this problem
exists due to the externalities arising from non-excludability of information
when it is disclosed to the market. In this context, such externalities cause
a divergence between privately and socially optimal levels of disclosure.
As an example, Admati and Pfleiderer show that in a model of voluntary
disclosure by firms in financial markets, externalities arise when the firms’
values are correlated.85 In such a setting, the costly disclosure of one firm
can be used for the valuation of other firms, which results in a free rider
problem. The free rider problem refers to a situation in a public goods game
in which some players do not pay for what they consume.86 As applied to
the hedge fund context, the competitors of a disclosing hedge fund will
have free access to the data disclosed by the hedge fund. This will help the
81

George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 499–500 (1970).
82
Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting
and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research 16 (Mar. 13,
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstranct=1105398.
83
Id.
84
OGUS, supra note 36, at 34.
85
Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure
Regulation and Externalities, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 479, 512 (2000).
86
Id. at 500–01.
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disclosing firm’s competitors, while the cost of disclosure is entirely borne
by the disclosing firm.87 Free riding undermines the incentives to produce
information in the first place.
In such a scenario, Admati and Pfleiderer demonstrate that the amount
of disclosure is often suboptimal and there is room for disclosure regulation to improve social welfare.88 In addition, Fishman and Hagerty argue
that mandatory disclosure is necessary in markets in which information
about the product is relatively difficult to understand.89 Since financial
products and services are credence goods,90 a mandatory disclosure system
seems necessary.
In the absence of a mandatory disclosure system for hedge funds, the
free rider problem prevents hedge funds from signaling quality by voluntarily registering with a credible regulator. In such a setting, information in
financial markets is under-provided. Consequently, the signaling effects of
registering with reputable regulators are reduced. Since registration (and
disclosure) involves costs that do not provide substantial benefits to hedge
funds due to reduced signaling effects, there will be no incentive to register
with credible regulators. Therefore, in the absence of a general system of
mandatory disclosure, the direct regulation of hedge funds will arguably be
short-circuited by regulatory arbitrage.
B. Placebo Effects of Direct Regulation
In the hedge fund industry, hedge funds’ counterparties and their investors provide most market discipline. Institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to their investors to carry out due diligence when investing in
hedge funds.91 Due diligence requires performing an initial review as well
as ongoing monitoring and assessment of hedge funds’ risks and their adherence to certain strategies, risk management policies, and internal operating controls disclosed in their private placement memoranda and other
related documents.92 In addition, the fiduciary duties of the managers of the
87

Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is
Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1345–46 (1999).
88
Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 85, at 512–13.
89
Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure
in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 45, 47 (2003).
90
Alessio M. Pacces & Roger J. Van den Bergh, An Introduction to the Law and
Economics of Regulation, in “Regulation and Economics,” ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 8–9 (Alessio M. Pacces & Roger J. Van den Bergh eds., 2d ed. 2012). For
more details about the concept of credence goods, see Philip Nelson, Information and
Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 311–12 (1970).
91
Cole et al., supra note 19, at 11.
92
Id.
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institutional investors towards their own investors require institutional investors to monitor hedge funds’ leverage. In other words, managers of the
investment funds should protect their funds against any counterparty risk
to their own investment funds posed by excessive leverage taking by hedge
funds.93 These institutions can also require hedge funds to abide by certain
industry standards regarding valuation, reporting, ethics, and risk management set by self-regulatory organizations.94
Nevertheless, it is argued that government regulation can negatively
affect the market discipline induced by the effective performance of the
duty to conduct due diligence by institutional investors, because regulation
can generate a false impression of safety for financial institutions. In other
words, the very introduction of supposedly stability-enhancing mechanisms
by governments may create a sense of comfort in financial institutions engaging in risky financial activities with the directly regulated firm. Although
in the literature on the direct regulation of hedge funds the change in the risk
perception and the false impression of safety stemming from the regulation
of hedge funds is referred to as “moral hazard,”95 such a regulation-induced
illusion of safety can hardly be characterized as such in the absence of effective risk shifting to governments and their taxpayers.96 This behavioral
93

Id.
Id. at 11–12.
95
See Crockett, supra note 13, at 25; see also Barry Eichengreen & Donald Mathieson,
Hedge Funds: What Do We Really Know?, 19 INT’L MONETARY FUND, ECON. ISSUES
(1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues19/; King & Maier,
supra note 76, at 293–94; Danièle Nouy, Indirect Supervision of Hedge Funds, 10 FIN.
STABILITY REV. 95, 97 (2007). Some scholars argue that even creating an international
clearinghouse or credit registry containing information about hedge fund leverage can
result in a moral hazard problem for lenders. See Eichengreen & Mathieson, supra note
95. Some commentators suggest that direct regulation that increases the transparency of
counterparty exposures or trading positions is not feasible, and that it may create a moral
hazard problem reducing overall market efficiency. See Michael R. King & Philipp Maier,
Hedge Funds and Financial Stability: The State of the Debate 16 (Bank of Can. Discussion
Paper, No. 2007-9, 2007), available at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2007/09/discussion
-paper-2007-9/. King and Maier argue that increased regulation may lead individual hedge
funds to take on more risks or to invest less effort on risk management. See King & Maier,
supra note 76, at 293–94. In their view, moral hazard of this type can increase systemic
risk. Id.
96
Moral hazard occurs in situations in which the costs of risk taking are borne by a party
other than the risk taker herself, or in a situation in which the risk taker believes that the
costs of such risks can be shifted to parties other than herself. Moral Hazard, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/moralhazard.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). Precisely defined, moral hazard is an opportunistic behavior characterized by the exploitation
of the less informed party by an informed party through an unobserved action. Id. Therefore, moral hazard does not involve changes in the risk perception of hedge funds by
direct regulation.
94
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effect of hedge fund regulation is therefore best described as a “placebo
effect of law.”97
Like medical placebo effects, laws also have placebo effects. The placebo effect of a law “manipulates individuals’ expectations regarding a risk
that the law addresses.”98 Therefore, the introduction of new laws and regulations can change the risk perception of the individuals regarding the regulated activity or entity, whereas the effective impact of the laws in question
on risk-taking is much lower and could be nil.99 The placebo effect, however, alters the welfare of the regulated individuals and firms independently
of the real effects of law.100 Legal placebo effect can cause a convergence or
divergence of the individuals’ perception of the probability and magnitude
of risks with regard to the objective risk.101 “Positive placebo effect” of a
law occurs when prior to the implementation of a law, individuals overestimate a risk and perceive the legislation as mitigating that risk.102 In other
words, the law’s effect is to reduce the level of perceived risks in individuals who overestimate the risks had no legislation been passed. The most
prominent example of such an effect was documented in the aviation industry after the 9/11 attacks to the World Trade Center.103
With respect to hedge fund direct regulation, the mere existence of a
(direct) regulatory regime may reduce the vigilance of hedge funds’ counterparties who are the primary source of market discipline.104 Furthermore, the
97

Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law, supra note 41, at 54. See also Amitai Aviram,
Allocating Regulatory Resources, 37 J. CORP. L. 739, 739–42 (2012).
98
Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law, supra note 41, at 57.
99
Aviram, Allocating Regulatory Resources, supra note 97, at 760.
100
Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law, supra note 41, at 56–57. The placebo effect of
law can also provide an explanation for the demand for regulation. Indeed, such an effect
might be a reason why even the firms that in normal times oppose regulations may, in distressed times, demand regulation to enhance trust in the system. Examples of such demand
for regulation abound: the rise in demand for regulation after the publication of Upton
Sinclair’s novel The Jungle, and rise in demand for new regulations after the Enron scandal
(culminating in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) are the most prominent. See
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation, in
GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 13–15 (Edward
J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010).
101
Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law, supra note 41, at 57.
102
See id. at 60–61 (discussing details about positive placebo effect, negative placebo
effect, positive anti-placebo effect, and the negative anti-placebo effect of law).
103
Immediately after the attacks, the number of flight passengers significantly plummeted. Id. at 55–56. On November 19, the U.S. government enacted the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (“ATSA”) to improve aviation security. Id. The ATSA was
followed by a surge in the number of passengers. Id.
104
See Crockett, supra note 13, at 25; Eichengreen & Mathieson, supra note 95; King &
Maier, The State of the Debate, supra note 95, at 16; LHABITANT, supra note 43, at 37–38;
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introduction of such a direct regulation may induce hedge funds to think
that if strategies become crowded or hazardous the supervisors will alert
them.105 Such a false impression may result in a suboptimal investment of
hedge funds in risk management.106 In short, the regulatory agency’s supervision and oversight of hedge funds may create a legal placebo effect by
giving hedge funds’ counterparties and investors the false impression that
these institutions are safe to invest and do business with.107
Indirect regulation of hedge funds is less prone to creating a false illusion of safety or legal placebo effect. It can mitigate the negative implications
of the positive placebo effects that direct regulation creates in hedge funds’
counterparties. The key reason is that indirect regulation works by delegating
the supervisory functions to hedge funds’ counterparties and investors.108
By doing so, indirect regulation credibly signals to hedge funds’ counterparties that no regulatory agency other than the counterparties themselves
will discipline hedge funds.109 Therefore, the indirect regulation will involve
no risk misperceptions arising from placebo effects of the law.
C. Heterogeneity of Hedge Funds and One-Size-Fits-All Direct Regulation
To avoid the costs of regulation, the responsive strategies of financial
firms to regulation have induced every “otherwise non-hedge fund investment pool” to circumvent the restrictions of regulation by complying with
the statutory exceptions to become a “hedge fund.” Such a move to acquire
hedge fund status and make use of statutory exemptions increased the
heterogeneity of funds bearing the hedge fund brand name.110 Therefore,
THE GRP. OF THIRTY, WORKING GRP. ON FIN. REFORM, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 60 (2009).
105
King & Maier, supra note 76, at 293.
106
Id. at 293–94.
107
On the other hand, McVea argues that given that moral hazard problems impairing
market discipline are “an inevitable part of any responsible regulatory regime,” concerns
about moral hazard should not stifle all regulatory attempts to address the negative
(systemic) externalities. Harry McVea, Hedge Funds and the New Regulatory Agenda, 27
LEGAL STUD. 709, 737 (2007). Nevertheless, this approach implies that a necessary step
in the introduction of every regulatory measure for hedge funds should be to take account
its unintended consequences and provide safeguards against it.
108
King & Maier, The State of the Debate, supra note 95, at 11.
109
This occurs while the banks themselves are being watched by the regulators.
110
For example, Payne criticizes the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive
(AIFMD) for failing to adequately differentiate between hedge funds and private equity
funds in regulating these two different types of alternative investment funds. See Payne,
supra note 2, at 584; see also Rothschild, supra note 2. Rothschild argues that the AIFMD
casts its regulatory net so wide that it captures other firms such as investment trusts in
Britain. Id.
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today the term “hedge fund” applies to many different funds with vastly
heterogeneous investment strategies sharing only the formal compliance
with the letter of the law.
Given the heterogeneity of hedge fund types and their unrestricted investment strategies, one-size-fits-all solutions for such financial entities
are not a viable option. For some hedge funds, proprietary information is
more crucial than for others. The value of such information for hedge
funds depends on what strategies they specialize in. Some hedge funds are
not willing to disclose information even at the expense of foregoing more
investments or receiving better credit terms.111 They cannot disclose information for fear that their information disclosure may strategically be
used against them. For example, a hedge fund holding a large number of
short positions may put itself at risk of a short squeeze112 by disclosing its
positions.113 In addition, due to the economies of scale in information production, information disclosure is less costly for larger hedge funds than for
smaller ones. Therefore, the costs of information disclosure and reporting
will be borne disproportionately. Put differently, smaller hedge funds will
incur costs disproportionate to their size.
Given all the above factors undermining the direct regulation of hedge
funds, there are arguments in favor of indirect regulation, which can simply
achieve goals that direct regulation cannot achieve. We will argue that indirect regulation is more appropriate in the context of hedge fund regulation. The reasons for this are based on the existence of suitable surrogate
regulators, on the resistance of the indirect regulation to regulatory arbitrage, and finally on the positive implications of enhanced regulatory competition among “surrogate regulators” in terms of efficiency and resistance
to regulatory capture.
III. INDIRECT REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS
In contrast to direct regulation, which is applied directly to the hedge
fund entity itself or to the activities immediately performed by hedge funds,
indirect regulation includes “market discipline-inspired regulatory measures
targeting the creditors and counterparties of hedge funds (mainly, but not
111

Cole et al., supra note 19, at 12.
See LHABITANT supra note 46, at 33.
113
Id. (detailing historical examples of short squeezes). Nevertheless, these arguments
half reveal and half conceal the underlying facts about hedge funds and other regulated financial institutions. For example, if the short squeeze argument applies to hedge funds, it can also
be applicable to other financial institutions engaging in options contracts. Although some
financial institutions are prohibited from taking short positions through short sales, they can
establish the same positions by purchasing put-options on the underlying securities.
112
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exclusively, their prime brokers and securities brokers).”114 In other words,
indirect regulation is based on the regulation of financial institutions that
either provide financial services to hedge funds or are their counterparties.
These institutions, in turn, are given the incentives to oversee hedge funds.115
Therefore, a key element in the indirect approach is regulator’s reliance on
market participants—namely investors, creditors, and counterparties—to
reward well-managed hedge funds and to punish poorly managed ones.116
Such an approach to indirect regulation can be seen as a form of delegation of regulatory functions from regulatory agencies to the stakeholders of
a given activity.117 These stakeholders play the role of surrogate regulators.
As a consequence of such devolution, the entity assuming the regulatory
functions, under certain conditions, takes on those regulatory functions and
applies them to the target entity.118 Regulatory functions can be delegated to
public interest groups (PIGs), to the firms themselves, to their industry associations, or to the firms’ competitors.119 One example is the delegation of
regulatory functions to Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs)120 such as
stock exchanges, industry associations, and credit rating agencies.121 After
114

Id.

115

ATHANASSIOU, supra note 25, at 227. He further adds that:
[t]he aim of such measures would be to enhance the counterparty risk
management practices that financial institutions apply in their dealings
with hedge funds and/or to impose disclosure duties on prime brokers
and other crucial hedge fund counterparties in respect of their hedge fund
exposures. An indirect approach could be complemented by the obligatory ‘registration’ of managers of hedge funds in conjunction with the
(voluntary) improvement, by the hedge fund industry itself, of its transparency, risk management and asset valuations standards and practices.

DIXON ET AL., supra note 19, at 34, 86.
Cole et al., supra note 19, at 11–12.
117
Id. at 11.
118
Cole et al., supra note 19, at 11.
119
IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
REGULATION DEBATE 158 (1992).
120
Alternatively, government regulators can delegate their regulatory functions to the
firm’s competitors. This type of regulatory delegation provides the markets with horizontal
accountability (or market accountability).
121
In this sense, SROs act as surrogate regulators. The examples of SROs in financial
markets are, inter alia, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the National
Securities Exchanges including the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ). Managed Funds
Association (MFA) is an industry association and self-regulatory agency for hedge funds.
Nevertheless, a government regulator sometimes maintains some residual rights or regulatory
functions to monitor and take action on the activities of SROs. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE,
supra note 119, at 102–08. This type of self-regulation is often referred to as “enforced-self
regulation.” Id. The notion of enforced-self regulation lies somewhere between voluntary
116
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the recent global financial crisis and introduction of numerous heavyhanded regulation, some hedge fund SROs are being formed “to head off further regulatory scrutiny by drafting self-regulatory codes of best practice.”122
Furthermore, indirect regulation can be conceived as “intermediated
regulation,” or regulation that is primarily applied to an intermediary
through whom the effects are channeled into the primary target of the
regulation. With respect to hedge fund regulation, this approach implies
the indirect regulation of hedge funds through the direct regulation of
other market participants.123 For example, putting a cap on the leverage
ratio or increasing the counterparty risk management standards for prime
brokers, which are the main counterparties of hedge funds, will have the
effect of reducing lending to hedge funds or requiring more diligence on the
part of prime brokers dealing with their hedge fund clients.124 The introduction of Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act125 (also known as the Volcker
Rule), prohibiting proprietary trading by banking entities and restricting
their investment in hedge funds and private equity funds, is an example of
such a regulatory strategy.126
self-regulation and direct regulation. Id. Although it is less intrusive than direct regulation,
it is more interventionist and intrusive than the voluntary self-regulation. Id. In such a
system, firms or their industry associations are required to make their own rules. Id. The
government agencies afterwards ratify those rules. Id. From that point on, if there is noncompliance with those privately-laid and publicly ratified rules, the rules will be publicly
enforced against the firms or their associations. Id.
122
Harry McVea, Hedge Fund Regulation, Market Discipline and the Hedge Fund
Working Group, 4 CAP. MKT. L.J. 63, 83 (2009). Crafting self-regulation by the industry to
shield against and probably divert the coming tides of regulation by the state seems to be a
recursive pattern in the history of financial regulation. See ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM
WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW 81–82 (2007).
Such a practice can indeed blunt the edge of the regulatory sword and forestall aggressive
government intervention. See Andreas Engert, Transnational Hedge Fund Regulation, 11
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 329, 333–35 (2010). In addition, since without government’s active role in the enforcement of the SROs’ rules they remain deficient, it is argued that selfregulation can only complement government regulation and cannot substitute it. See id.
123
See Paul M. Jonna, In Search of Market Discipline: The Case for Indirect Hedge
Fund Regulation, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 989, 1009–10 (2008).
124
See generally Jon Daníelsson et al., Highwaymen or Heroes: Should Hedge Funds
Be Regulated? 1 J. FIN. STABILITY 522 (2005).
125
12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012).
126
The Volcker Rule is part of the post-financial crisis regulatory reforms aimed at
addressing problems associated with hedge and private equity funds’ interconnectedness
with Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs). Volcker Rule, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/terms/v/volcker-rule.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). The Volcker
Rule accomplishes its goals by prohibiting proprietary trading and banking entities’ investments in and sponsorship of hedge funds and private equity funds. Id. These prohibitions
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Crafting appropriate indirect regulatory mechanisms for hedge funds requires identifying the financial institutions that have the most consistent, continuous, and day-to-day relationships with hedge funds. Identifying these
institutions means identifying those equipped with sufficient knowledge and
understanding of hedge funds and their activities in financial markets.127
These institutions can potentially be used as “surrogate regulators” with
regulatory functions delegated from government agencies.128
To fully understand the indirect regulation of hedge funds through the
most appropriate surrogate regulators, a brief overview of the prime brokerage industry is in order. The most significant hedge fund counterparties are
the financial institutions providing prime finance or prime brokerage services to hedge funds.129 Prime brokerage is best defined in the SEC NoAction Letter of 1994 as
a system developed by full-service firms to facilitate the clearance and
settlement of securities trades for substantial retail and institutional investors who are active market participants. Prime brokerage involves
three distinct parties: the prime broker, the executing broker, and the
customer. The prime broker is a registered broker-dealer that clears and
finances the customer trades executed by one or more other registered
broker-dealers (“executing broker”) at the behest of the customer.130
pursue three major objectives: (1) addressing problems arising from hedge fund interconnectedness with LCFIs, (2) preventing cross-subsidization of private funds by depository
institutions having access to government explicit and implicit guarantees, and (3) regulating
conflicts of interest between banks, their customers, and hedge funds. See Hossein Nabilou,
Addressing Interconnectedness of Hedge Funds with Large Complex Financial Institutions:
Is the Volcker Rule Panacea? (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Working Paper,
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2329335.
127
In this sense, indirect regulation becomes very similar to regulation by standards,
because it relies on decentralized knowledge. For more information about how standards
involves utilizing such knowledge, see Hans-Bernd Schaefer, Legal Rules and Standards,
in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE, Volume II 347, 349 (Charles K. Rowley &
Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004).
128
Prime brokers offer a range of services to hedge funds. Key functions include collateralized financing of hedge fund exposures and execution of over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives transactions, partly through prime brokers interposing themselves between hedge
fund transactions with third parties. This role of prime brokers puts them on the top of the
list of candidates who can take on the indirect regulation of hedge funds. See Axel A. Weber,
Hedge Funds: A Central Bank Perspective, 10 FIN. STABILITY REV. 161, 166–67 (2007).
129
Giorgio Tosetti Dardanelli, Direct or Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds: A
European Dilemma, 2011 EURO. J. RISK REG. 463 (2011).
130
Prime Broker Committee Request, SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 WL 808441 (Jan. 25,
1994); see also PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE,
AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT p. B-4 (1999), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/documents/hedgfund.pdf.
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In other words, prime brokerage services are the services offered by prime
brokers, who are part of major investment banks and securities firms, to
their prime clients, such as hedge funds and other professional investors.
These services include securities lending, repo financing, acting as custodian of customers’ securities, clearing customers’ transactions, capital raising for customers, and providing seed investment for prime clients.131 Prime
brokers also offer execution brokerage services, such as services related to
trade execution, transition management, commission sharing arrangements,
direct market access (DMA), and research.132
There are three main categories of prime brokers: elite prime brokers,
leading prime brokers (the leading prime brokers include Bank of America,
Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, BNP Paribas, UBS, Deutsche Bank, Citigroup, and others), and tertiary regional and smaller niche prime brokers.133
The prime finance market was historically an oligopoly with major dominant U.S. investment banks such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and
Bear Stearns (now JPMorgan Chase) dominating the market.134 Although
the prime brokers’ primary clients are hedge funds, hedge funds are not
alone in using prime brokerage services.135 A number of other financial
market players including private equity funds, pension funds, investment
companies, sovereign wealth funds, and other national and multinational
corporations constitute the broad range of prime brokers’ clients.136
Hedge funds have at least three main relationships with Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs), which are engaged in offering prime
brokerage services. An LCFI can be a hedge fund’s prime broker, its trading
counterparty, or the owner or manager of a hedge fund.137 These three main
roles are not mutually exclusive, and one LCFI can simultaneously undertake all three tasks.138 As mentioned above, in the prime brokerage function,
LCFIs offer a range of services including financial, administrative, and
operational services.139
131

See AIKMAN, supra note 8, at 125–26.
Id.
133
Id. at 32.
134
Jenny Anderson, U.S. Regulators Grow Alarmed Over ‘Hedge Fund Hotels’—
Business—International Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes
.com/2007/01/01/business/worldbusiness/01iht-Hedge.4071677.html?pagewanted=all.
135
See AIKMAN, supra note 8, at 57.
136
Id.
137
The Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. imposed major limitations on the relationships
between hedge funds and banking entities. See generally Volcker Rule, supra note 126.
138
King & Maier, The State of the Debate, supra note 95, at 290.
139
Their main financial service is secured lending. The range of services that prime
brokers offer to their hedge fund clients arms them with vast knowledge of the hedge fund
132
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Hedge funds are also trading counterparties of LCFIs across a full range
of financial instruments. They participate in the primary and secondary markets for securities underwritten by LCFIs, which means that hedge funds
and LCFIs are often exposed to similar risks arising from similar underlying financial instruments.140 These common risk exposures were highlighted
in the recent financial crisis. For example, a default by a prime broker might
transmit the problem to hedge funds. This occurred in the collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) markets after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, a
prime broker.141 The global financial crisis particularly highlighted the
risks for hedge funds originating from the exposure to one prime broker,
Lehman.142 Last, LCFIs can also be hedge fund owners and managers.
Needless to say, the greatest concern arises when the three roles overlap and
concentrate in one LCFI.
Given the above institutional setting and the relationship between hedge
funds and their prime brokers, indirect measures for regulating hedge funds
primarily focus on the regulation of their counterparties, creditors, and
investors, the most important of which are prime brokers. Therefore, indirect regulation requires that regulations be imposed on hedge fund prime
brokers as counterparties, rather than on the hedge funds themselves. Such
measures include:
x
x
x
x
x
x

Mandatory registration, regulation and supervision of prime
brokers and banks which provide loans to hedge funds;143
Prohibiting banks from managing, controlling, or sponsoring hedge funds (the Volcker Rule);144
Limitations on the qualifications of depositaries145 and prime
brokers;
Oversight of trading relations;
Capital adequacy requirements for prime brokers;
Robust internal risk management systems for prime brokers;

business. Again, these constant interactions with hedge funds make them the most suitable
institution to perform the indirect regulation of hedge funds.
140
King & Maier, supra note 76, at 291.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 290.
143
TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, HEDGE FUNDS OVERSIGHT: FINAL REPORT 8–16 (2009).
144
Eechoud et al., supra note 9, at 270–71.
145
In contrast to an institution holding the assets pursuant to a security arrangement, a
depositary is an institution that holds assets of a hedge fund in custody for safekeeping
purposes. See Angus Duncan, Edmond Curtin & Marco Crosignani, Alternative Regulation:
The Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, 6 CAP. MKT. L.J. 326, 360–61
(2011). Therefore, a hedge fund’s depositary acts as a custodian of its assets. Id.
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Improving the information available in the market in which
hedge funds operate by transforming over-the-counter (OTC)
markets146 into centrally cleared exchanges;147
Devising processes to obtain relevant information for crisis
management;
Wealth and sophistication requirements for hedge fund investors.148

The most compelling argument for the indirect regulation of hedge
funds is rooted in the fact that hedge funds’ herding behavior and counterparty risks (giving rise to interconnectedness externalities)149 are the major
transmission channels of systemic risk.150 And because indirect regulation
requires focusing on the relationships of hedge funds with LCFIs, it is the
most appropriate policy instrument to tackle the problems arising from the
interconnectedness of hedge funds with LCFIs. The top prime brokers are
almost all LCFIs that have exposure to hedge funds and to each other. This
interconnectedness makes them a key channel of systemic risk contagion
stemming from hedge funds.151
146

OTC financial products are non-standardized or customized products traded directly
between two counterparties and without any exchange facilities involved in the trade. OverThe-Counter—OTC, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/otc.asp (last
visited Nov. 19, 2014). OTC products are contrasted with exchange-traded financial instruments or products, which are standardized instruments cleared through exchanges. Id.
147
Christian Noyer, Hedge Funds: What are the Main Issues?, 10 FIN. STABILITY
REV. 105, 109–11 (2007).
148
There are proposals for indirect hedge fund regulation already in place. See, e.g.,
Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 37–38 (2006)
(stating that direct regulation might be harmful). Oesterle supports indirect regulation
through capital adequacy requirements for bank lending to hedge fund counterparties and
the introduction of mandatory disclosure requirements with respect to banks’ direct
material exposure to hedge funds. Id. Eichengreen and Mathieson propose the idea of a
“clearinghouse or credit registry that would assemble information from national sources.”
Eichengreen & Mathieson, supra note 95. Cole et al. also propose that the “[b]anks should
see both quantitative and qualitative indicators of a hedge fund’s net asset value, risk exposures, and liquidity. Where this information is not forthcoming from a particular hedge
fund, counterparties should tighten margin collateral and other credit terms.” Cole et al.,
supra note 19, at 11–12.
149
Interconnectedness externalities originate from the failure of one firm and can
impose costs on other financial firms not directly related to the failing firm.
150
King & Maier, supra note 76, at 286–87.
151
Direct exposure of hedge funds to LCFIs can arise from several types of transactions
that can be divided into two main categories: (1) transactions where banks act as counterparties to hedge funds, such as unsecured lending, secured financing (including repo markets),
prime brokerage and OTC derivatives; and (2) transactions where banks act as investors
in hedge funds, either in their proprietary trading or in order to offer to their customers
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The next Section argues in support of the indirect regulation of hedge
funds. The main argument is that since the most important channels of
propagation of systemic risk from hedge funds is through their relationships with LCFIs, the indirect regulation of hedge funds through their
counterparties is the best method to cope with this problem. Therefore, the
most prominent advantage of the indirect regulation of hedge funds over
direct regulation is that it focuses precisely on the financial institutions
and channels through which hedge funds’ systemic externalities tend to
propagate.152 Whether crafted as a form of delegated regulatory functions
or as intermediated regulation, the indirect regulation of hedge funds has
the following advantages over the direct regulation.
A. Existence of Suitable “Surrogate Regulators”
Before introducing new regulation for hedge funds, it is important for
regulators to ask why regulation of hedge funds should be different from that
of other financial institutions such as commercial and investment banks,
mutual funds, insurance companies, and pension funds. The main differences
between the hedge fund industry and other mainstream financial institutions,
which justify differential regulatory treatment of the hedge fund industry, are
in the number and composition of hedge funds’ financiers,153 hedge funds’
capital structure, and the investor liquidity in the hedge fund industry.
First, banks have a large number of creditors (depositors) mostly with low
amounts of deposits in the bank. Because of their number and dispersion,
depositors lack the incentive to monitor the bank’s financial standing.154
The pervasiveness of free riding eliminates the incentives for dispersed depositors to provide monitoring, because there is hardly any way in which
small depositors can fully reap the benefits of their activities. The economic
literature shows that in a repeated, cooperative public good game with a small
number of players and the presence of an effective threat of punishment,
cooperation for the provision of public goods (monitoring mechanism) is
likely to emerge.155 As the number of players increases, however, this cooperation will likely fail, because “as the number of participants becomes
critically large, the individual will more and more come to treat the behavior
traditional or structured products indexed to hedge funds’ returns. See Nouy, supra note
95, at 101–03.
152
BANK OF ENG., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 37 (Apr. 2007), http://www.bank
ofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/2007/fsrfull0704.pdf.
153
Daníelsson et al., supra note 124, at 5–6. See also Cole et al. supra note 19, 11.
154
In other words, this occurs because the depositors are rationally apathetic.
155
See, e.g.Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods
Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980 (2000).
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of ‘all others’ as beyond his own possible range of influence.”156 This chilling effect can result in the failure of cooperation and hence under-provision
of monitoring functions in the financial markets by a large number of depositors. Therefore, in the normal course of free and unregulated financial
markets, depositors will not provide such a monitoring mechanism. As a
result, governments assume this monitoring function, hence the so-called
“efficient centralization of monitoring” function in financial regulation.157
Nonetheless, the financing schemes and conditions are entirely different in the case of hedge funds. Hedge fund counterparties and creditors are
strong, well-empowered and sophisticated prime brokers, and their investors
are mainly institutional investors. Recent data suggest a rise in institutional
investors along with a simultaneous decline in the high-net-worth individuals
(HNWIs), who used to be the main investors in hedge funds.158

By definition, these investors are in a position to impose conditions on
loans to hedge funds (by demanding fully secured loans and even higher
standards) and to prevent them from pursuing risky strategies with borrowed money. Indeed, the constraints imposed by strong counterparties on
156

James M. Buchanan, Cooperation and Conflict in Public-Goods Interaction, 5
ECON. INQUIRY 109, 116 (1967). According to Aristotle, “what is held in common by the
largest number of people receives the least care.” See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 28 (C.D.C.
Reeve trans., 1998). This shows the commons or public goods feature of market discipline
in this setting.
157
Engert, supra note 122, at 344.
158
DAVID STOWELL, INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY 226
(2nd ed. 2013).
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hedge funds might very well explain the lower levels of leverage in the
hedge fund industry compared with depository institutions.159
In addition, the prime brokerage industry tends to be heavily concentrated. At the end of the year 2006, the top three dealers performing prime
brokerage functions serviced fifty-eight percent of the assets under management (AUM) by hedge funds.160 At the same time, the top ten dealers serviced eighty-four percent of hedge funds’ AUM.161 The pie chart below
shows that the concentration in the prime brokerage industry has remained
almost intact after the global financial crisis. The fewer number of major
prime brokers acting as hedge fund counterparties facilitates the mutual monitoring of hedge fund compliance with the standards set by prime brokers.162

159

Hedge fund investors are mostly institutional investors and HNWIs who are supposed to be able to “fend for themselves” and are capable of monitoring hedge funds. Id.
160
King & Maier, supra note 76, at 290–91.
161
Id.
162
Engert, supra note 122, at 351–54.
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The second difference is related to the moral hazard problem. Deposit
insurance schemes protecting banks’ depositors from losses reduce their
incentives to monitor the financial safety and soundness of their banks. Furthermore, the depositors’ trust in their banks rests partially upon the government’s prudential regulation. Because of the deposit insurance scheme
and prudential regulation, the solvency of the banking system is not a concern for ordinary depositors.163 This substantially reduces the risk of banking crises in the form of traditional bank runs.164 Unlike depositors in a
bank who are generally insured by governments, hedge fund investors are
equity holders and the entire amount of their investment is exposed to loss
if the hedge fund goes bankrupt. Given their exposure to risk, hedge fund
investors have a strong incentive to monitor the activities, strategies, and
positions of hedge funds. Therefore, the capital structure of hedge funds
ensures stronger incentives for private monitoring than that of banks.165
The third significant difference between hedge funds and banks concerns investor liquidity. Banks are traditionally engaged in maturity transformation and the provision of liquidity.166 In contrast, hedge funds are not
major maturity transformers.167 Unlike banks that take demand deposits,
hedge funds only redeem investors’ money intermittently.168 Moreover, they
often impose further restrictions on the investor redemptions using gates
and side-pocket arrangements.169 Restrictions on investor redemptions enhance investors’ loyalty to a firm and give investors more incentives to raise
their voices (in terms of monitoring and management) instead of just threatening to exit.170 Obviously, the restriction on investment redemptions limits
163

Id. at 344.
Indeed, what induced banking regulation was the inefficient monitoring mechanism
by small, indifferent, diffuse, and unsophisticated depositors, themselves in need of protection.
165
Engert, supra note 122, at 351–54.
166
Eechoud, supra note 9, at 277.
167
Id.
168
Nouy, supra note 95, at 103.
169
These mechanisms for restricting hedge funds’ investor liquidity are often used ex
ante. See Adam Aiken, Christopher Clifford & Jesse Ellis, Discretionary Liquidity: Hedge
Funds, Side Pockets, and Gates 1 (Nov. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.financialrisksforum.com/risk2013/work/6024018.pdf. There are other discretionary
methods of liquidity restrictions in hedge funds. Discretionary liquidity restrictions (DLRs)
are classified as gates and side pockets. Id. Aiken, Clifford and Ellis show that imposition
of such restrictions by hedge fund managers to limit the feet voting in the hedge fund
industry, and allegedly to protect hedge fund investors from themselves (by preventing firesales in distressed markets), not only did not contribute to well-functioning hedge funds,
but were also followed by continued underperformance. See id. They show that such restrictions further raised the costs of capital for such firms. See id.
170
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30–35 (1970). Exit, or voting with feet, is known as
164
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the ability of investors to exit171 (at least in the short run), this commits
them to playing a more active role in monitoring the fund.172 Such redemption restrictions force hedge fund investors and partners to be actively
involved in the monitoring of hedge funds, while the easy exit in banks,
mutual funds, and similar investment vehicles reduces the depositors’ and
investors’ incentives to engage in monitoring.
In the presence of such strong, well-incentivized counterparties taking
part in the private monitoring of hedge funds, it is easier to plug in new
regulatory measures aimed at enhancing and harnessing the existing mechanisms that already discipline hedge funds. In this sense, indirect regulation
is also practical from a regulatory perspective, because it relies on the existing institutional settings and focuses on financial institutions most of which
are already under the supervision of banking regulators.173
Overall, the institutional settings of the market in which hedge funds
operate support the case for indirect regulation making use of counterparties
as surrogate regulators. In addition, because the major risks of hedge funds
for society lie in their interconnectedness with LCFIs—that is, the channels
for risk transmission are through their counterparties and creditors—hedge
funds’ investors, counterparties, and creditors are best placed to monitor the
propagation of systemic externalities.174
B. Indirect Regulation Is Less Likely to Result in Regulatory Capture
Since the inception of the debate on regulation, policymakers have
grappled with the problems of who monitors the monitor or, more specifically, who regulates the regulators.175 When an agency regulates a small
the “Wall Street rule” in the financial industry. Wall Street Rule, AMEX.COM, http://www
.amex.com/servlet/AmexFnDictionary?pageid=display&titleid=6373 (last visited Nov. 19,
2014).
171
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
172
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 170, at 30–35.
173
King & Maier, supra note 76, at 293–94.
174
Jean-Pierre Roth, Highly Leveraged Institutions and Financial Stability: A Case
for Regulation? 108 (Univ. of St. Gallen Law Sch., Law and Econ. Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 2008-18, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1138204.
175
“Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” or “who’s going to chaperone the chaperones
themselves?”, sometimes paraphrased as: “who will guard the guardians themselves?” is
a phrase attributed to Juvenal, the Roman poet of the late 1st and early 2nd centuries AD.
See Holt N. Parker, Manuscripts of Juvenal and Persius, in A COMPANION TO PERSIUS AND
JUVENAL 137 (Susanna Braund & Josiah Osgood eds., 2012). See also NOURIEL ROUBINI
& STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE IN THE FUTURE OF FINANCE
211–19 (2010) (discussing the issue in the context of economic and financial regulation
in chapter 9).
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number of firms in a single industry, the likelihood of repeated interactions
is greater than when it regulates many firms in heterogeneous economic
sectors.176 Although repeated interactions breed cooperation, the problem
with regulatory cooperation is that the “features of regulatory encounters
that foster the evolution of cooperation also encourage the evolution of
capture and corruption.”177 Moreover, “[s]olutions to the problems of capture and corruption—limiting discretion, multiple-industry rather than singleindustry agency jurisdiction, and rotating personnel—inhibit the evolution
of cooperation.”178
In the context of hedge funds, assigning a large number of prime brokers
with regulatory tasks may create a less friendly environment for cooperation
between the surrogate regulator and “regulatee”; but this will also imply less
room for corruption. In contrast to the unitary regulatory systems or regulatory monopolies in which the demand for regulation is inelastic, regulatory
arbitrage provides substitutes for regulated firms, thereby making the demand
for regulation elastic. Such a dramatic change in the elasticity of demand
means that if regulators cannot provide good quality regulations at competitive prices, their regulatees will desert them. The increased elasticity of
demand brings about more accountability of regulators towards their regulatees. Such a market or “downward accountability”179 will impose constraints on regulators and can guard against corruption in regulatory systems.
That is why regulatory competition is proposed as a safeguard against regulatory capture.180
However, the elasticity of demand for regulatory services from the regulated firms is a function of the availability of alternative regulators.181 In a
harmonized regulatory system, the demand for regulatory services will be
176

AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119, at 54–56. Findings by Grabosky and
Braithwaite show that regulatory agencies that regulate “(1) smaller numbers of client
companies; (2) a single industry rather than diverse industries; (3) where the same inspectors were in regular contact with the same client companies; and (4) where the proportion
of inspectors with a background in the regulated industry was high” are more likely to
have a cooperative rather than prosecutorial regulatory practice. Id. at 55. The empirical
findings in that regard confirm the theory that “the evolution of cooperation should occur
only when regulator and the regulated firm are in a multi-period prisoner’s dilemma game.
Repeated encounters are required for cooperation to evolve.” Id.
177
Id. at 54.
178
Id. (proposing tripartism as a model of a regulatory process involving public interest
groups (PIGs) to address the problem of capture and corruption in regulatory environment,
the study of which is beyond the scope of this Article).
179
Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J.L. SOC’Y 38 (2000).
180
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119, at 54.
181
Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory
Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 1362 (2003).
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constant (high), while in a regulatory fragmentation model, ceteris paribus,
the demand increases with more harmonization and decreases with more
fragmentation.182 Therefore, harmonized regulators will be less accountable,
whereas fragmented regulators will be more accountable to their regulatees.
In the context of financial markets and the indirect regulation of hedge
funds, regulatory competition induced by entrusting a relatively large number of prime brokers with regulatory functions may create a less friendly
environment for the evolution of cooperation and corruption between regulators and regulatees.
C. Indirect Regulation and Regulatory Competition Among
Surrogate Regulators
One of the positive side effects of regulatory competition is the peer
pressure imposed by the competitors of incumbent regulators. The peer pressure among prime brokers as surrogate regulators will not only decrease
the likelihood of the evolution of corruption, but also will contribute to the
efficiency of surrogate regulators. A peer review mechanism arising from
competition can be as effective for regulators as it is for regulatees. For example, it is argued that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has been
effective in shaping and defining international regulations against money
laundering and terrorist financing partly because of the devolutionary nature
of its oversight mechanism.183 In the FATF, the oversight function is delegated to the regional groupings that conduct mutual valuations of other
members’ legal and regulatory policies.184 Such a mechanism essentially constitutes a peer review mechanism for assessing the group’s effectiveness in
effectuating compliance with the FATF’s standards.185 In addition, it potentially provides market benchmarks or yardsticks against which the regulatory
oversight can be assessed between different groupings in a kind of regulatory tournament.186 Economic theory suggests that yardstick competition
182

Id. at 1362–63.
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 68, at 72.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
These competitive pressures can prove more effective than other strategies offered to
promote regulatory efficiency and mitigate the probability of regulatory capture. Such a
mechanism for oversight of regulators works similarly to the mechanism in labor contracts.
In labor contracts and especially in franchise agreements, the franchisor (regulator) is not
able (or it is not cost-justified for her) to monitor the level of effort (input) of the franchisee, while the level of output is readily observable. In such a context, there are several
ways to deal with the information asymmetry problem. “Cost-of-service” regulation and
“lagged price adjustment” are two mechanisms proposed to address this problem. Andrei
183
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can achieve more efficient outcomes in franchise agreements and labor
contracts.187 As in the case of the FATF, yardstick competition can equally
be applied to regulatory competition.188
Several studies emphasize the welfare enhancing features of regulatory
competition.189 For example, it is argued that regulatory competition between accounting standards and providing corporations with the option of
choosing from among different regulators and reporting formats will improve the efficiency of corporate governance and accounting standardsetting and practices both domestically and internationally, and will result in
a lower cost of capital.190 Thus, a competitive accounting regime is to be
preferred to a monopoly regime, both domestically and internationally.191
The result of regulatory competition between surrogate regulators for
hedge fund regulation is that delegating regulation to counterparties of
hedge funds decreases the likelihood of regulatory capture. In addition, such
a delegation increases the efficiency of regulation by providing incentives
to surrogate regulators to compete with each other.
D. Indirect Regulation as Decentralized Regulation
The indirect regulation of hedge funds will more closely resemble standards as opposed to rules when applied to hedge funds. The indirect regulation of hedge funds can transform rules-based regulation into principles-based
regulation when prime brokers implement it. This is to say that precise rules
will be transformed into standards in at least three aspects. First, the application and enforcement of rules will be more decentralized. Second, rules
Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 319, 319–20 (1985).
However, both of these mechanisms can equally be inefficient. Id.
187
Id. In a recent study, it is elaborated how incentive-based pay schemes outperform
fixed pay and how tournament theory is less effective than piece rate in certain settings.
See M. Ali Choudhary et al., Individual Incentives and Workers’ Contracts: Evidence
from a Field Experiment (2012), available at http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/res
/2013/1023/CBGR_13_OCT_2012_v4.pdf.
188
Frank H. Easterbrook, Federalism and European Business Law, 14 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 125, 127–28 (1994). Indeed, when the competition involves political agents, the
tournament can be adapted to regulatory competition with the focus on the competition
between governments or regulators. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The
New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a SecondBest World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 256 (1997).
189
For more information regarding the arguments for regulatory competition by implementing competitive federalism approach, see Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors:
A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
190
Shyam Sunder, Regulatory Competition Among Accounting Standards Within and
Across International Boundaries, 21 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 231–32 (2002).
191
Id.
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will be applied with more flexibility, allowing for more variations in detail
and implementation. Third, rules will be applied with more discretion.
Therefore, indirect regulation has the ability to turn rules into standards
when applied to the primary target of regulation.
For example, a regulatory strategy aimed at reducing hedge fund leverage may do so by imposing leverage restrictions on prime brokers.192 A
cap on prime brokers’ leverage can be translated into effective but variable
caps on hedge fund leverage. In this case, it is the prime broker that will allocate the leveraged credit to hedge funds. Instead of directly putting a limit
on hedge fund leverage, regulators delegate the allocation of leverage to
prime brokers who are the main counterparties of hedge funds and who
have superior knowledge of the hedge fund business. Although such a leverage requirement will operate as a rigid and non-discretionary rule for prime
brokers, it will have the flexibility of standards for hedge funds. This is because prime brokers can customize the level of leverage and make loans to
hedge funds according to their financial needs and their safety and soundness goals. In turn, hedge funds that value leverage the most will apply for
more loans, and because banks are more efficient in monitoring borrowers,
they will have more flexibility in allocating loans on behalf of regulators.
Because hedge funds themselves can lend to each other, such a regulatory
cap on prime brokers’ leverage can, in essence, take the form of “leverage
cap and trade.” In the end, such discretion will provide flexibility in the
allocation of loans to hedge funds and result in a more efficient allocation
of credit.193
The principles-based regulation (PBR) approach by the organization
formerly known as the Financial Services Authority (FSA)194 is essentially
based on standards. One of the positive aspects of standards is that their flexibility allows regulated entities to choose the specific means of achieving
192

INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASSOC., ISDA RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN COMMISSION
CONSULTATION PAPER ON HEDGE FUNDS, available at http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf
/ISDArespECHFCP020809.pdf.
193
The idea of cap and trade originally comes from environmental economics. Under
this scheme, every company is given a voucher for production of a certain level of pollution. Cap and Trade Basics, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/cap
trade.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). If a company needs more pollution, it can buy a
voucher to pollute from other companies that do not need to pollute. Id. However, the overall level of pollution should not exceed certain thresholds. Id. Although the measurement
of leverage is not as straightforward as the measurement of pollution, the logic of the cap
and trade scheme could be used to limit the level of the leverage of the financial system
within its sustainable limits and also contribute to efficient allocation of leverage in the
financial system.
194
The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority
(FCA) have replaced the UK FSA.
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general goals set by regulators, especially when regulation involves target
and performance (or output) standards.195 Environmental standards effectively demonstrate the strength of this regulatory approach. Needless to say,
standard setting by means of target or output standards involves market
participants’ incentives and the market discipline in crafting strategies to
achieve the goals set by the standard-setter. Prior to the financial crisis, this
was one of the main reasons for the FSA to support standards over rules in
financial regulation under the guise of PBR.196 Indeed, similar to indirect
regulation, PBR is a type of regulation by standards that delegates the
details to lower regulatory levels.197
The PBR approach provides certain benefits for firms in that it is flexible, it facilitates innovation, and it enhances competition.198 In addition,
there are benefits for regulators in terms of flexibility, a facilitative role in
regulatory innovation in the methods and the types of supervision, and enhanced regulatory competition.199 Finally, PBR also increases the durability
of regulation in fast-changing financial markets.200 In conclusion, all stakeholders benefit from regulated firms improving conduct by focusing more
on substantive compliance rather than “creative compliance.”201
During the financial crisis, PBR came under criticism.202 Even the FSA
itself called it a failure on the grounds that “a principles-based approach
195

Ogus, supra note 36, at 150–51.
See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON THE OUTCOMES THAT MATTER 6 (2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles
.pdf. It seems that the FSA uses the term “principle” synonymous to the term “standard.”
This inference is best understood when it explicitly states that “[p]rinciples-based regulation means placing greater reliance on principles and outcome-focused, high-level rules as a
means to drive at the regulatory aims we want to achieve, and less reliance on prescriptive rules,” and “[f]or these reasons, we believe that further enhancing our risk-based and
evidence-based approach to regulation with an increased emphasis on principles and outcomes is not only the right but also the only way to progress our regulatory regime.” Id.
However, the term “principle” has different meanings in jurisprudence. This term may
generically refer to “principles” as “the whole set of standards other than rules.” See
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–33 (1977). Dworkin distinguishes
between principles and policies. In its generic sense, it seems that the definition of
“principles” is almost identical to the definition of “standards”. However, in its specific
sense, the standards as used in this paper, are policies per Dworkin. Id.
197
McBarnet, supra note 2, at 78–79.
198
Julia Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based Regulation, 3 CAP. MARKET
L.J. 425, 426 (2008).
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
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Hector Sants, Chief Executive Fin. Servs. Authority, Speech at Reuters Newsmakers
Event: Delivering Intensive Supervision and Credible Deterrence (Mar. 12, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2009/0312_hs.shtml).
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does not work with individuals who have no principles.”203 However, even
after the financial crisis, scholars suggested that the FSA and its successors
not to abandon PBR because of crisis-induced criticisms.204 The main concern is that going back to rules would result in increased legal engineering
because “creative compliance thrives on rule-based regulation, for tight
specific rules provide particularly solid material for legal engineers to work
with.”205 Therefore, adherents of PBR continuously call for a “commitment to principles-based regulation, accompanied by meaningful enforcement and oversight.”206
PBR provides for more flexibility with regard to the variations in details
and implementation to achieve a particular goal. It further offers opportunities for achieving more international harmonization207 and decentralization of regulatory functions. In addition to these advantages, PBR contains
another hidden aspect. That is, it can overcome legal engineering, which
tries to comply with the letter of the law while escaping its purpose and
spirit. By the same token, addressing legal and financial engineering to escape the spirit of the law was the driving force behind the adoption of PBR
by the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in the 1990s, “which saw it as
an essential bastion against opportunistic legal engineering.”208
Indeed, “principles-based regulation is seen as the only realistic response, the only way to try to capture the spirit of the law in the face of
constant creativity and technical challenge.”209 Indirect regulation coupled
with PBR can be more effective in preventing regulatory arbitrage by
hedge funds than the direct regulation based on rules.
E. Indirect Regulation Is More Feasible and Less Costly
We argue that indirect regulation is the preferred form of regulation for
the hedge fund industry because it entails lower costs and it is arguably
203

Id.
McBarnet, supra note 2, at 78–80. See also Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial
Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273
(2011); Cristie Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global
Financial Crisis, 55 MCGILL L.J. 257 (2010).
205
McBarnet, supra note 2, at 79.
206
Ford, supra note 204, at 257.
207
McBarnet, supra note 2, at 78.
208
Id. at 79.
209
Id. As McBarnet puts it:
Driving this approach is an explicit recognition that any specific rule
will be met by legal engineering to circumvent it, and principles-based
regulation is seen as the only realistic response, the only way to try to
capture the spirit of the law in the face of constant creativity and technical challenge.
Id.
204
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more effective. Indirect regulation significantly reduces regulatory expenses
and, at the same time, preserves “the necessary opaqueness of the activities
of hedge funds” enabling them to “continue to operate … and thus, expose
market inefficiencies.”210 We further argue that the “‘indirect supervision’
approach is the least intrusive and also the most effective in the short term,
in particular at the international level.”211
By indirectly regulating hedge funds, regulators take advantage of
market participants’ dispersed, but superior knowledge about firms, which
can diminish the likelihood of regulatory errors. Hence, there will be no
need for further investment in gathering data and other necessary steps for
regulatory intervention. These actions all require substantial investment on
the part of governments. In addition, indirect regulation is perceived to be
more politically feasible than direct regulation212 because it is less interventionist. Therefore, overcoming political status quo bias would be easier with
indirect regulation than with direct regulation.213
In order to measure the effectiveness of the indirect regulation of hedge
funds in reducing systemic risk, proxies for improvements in risk factors,
which can potentially make hedge funds less systemically important, should
be taken into account. Such proxies include reduced leverage, improved
funding liquidity,214 increased disclosure, and improved counterparty risk
management practices in the hedge fund industry. The available evidence
suggests that on all these counts, the action by hedge funds’ counterparties
led to significant improvements in the absence of direct regulation.215
Hedge fund leverage has been significantly lower compared to that of
other financial institutions. In particular, after the collapse of Long Term
Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, there was evidence of a decline in
210

WULF ALEXANDER KAAL, HEDGE FUND REGULATION BY BANKING SUPERVISION:
A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2005).
211
Noyer, supra note 147, at 111.
212
This might be the reason that European regulators imposed direct regulation on
hedge funds under the guise of and using the terminology of indirect regulation. The title
of the act is obviously telling: “The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive” and
not “The Alternative Investment Fund Directive.” Nonetheless, commentators believe
that the European AIFMD is more direct versus indirect in regulatory nature. See Giorgio
Tosetti Dardanelli, Direct or Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds: A European Dilemma,
2011 EURO. J. RISK REG. 463, 463–64 (2011). The same holds true for the U.S. regulators
who used the term “Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act.” The difference
is that U.S. regulators have leant more heavily towards indirect regulation.
213
Ferran, supra note 27, at 390; see also Lucia Quaglia, The ‘Old’ and ‘New’
Political Economy of Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union, 34 W. EURO.
POL. 665, 670 (2011).
214
Funding liquidity refers to the ease with which a firm can acquire funds.
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King & Maier, supra note 76, at 294–95.
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the leverage of the hedge fund industry as a whole.216 These lower levels of
leverage were documented especially prior to the financial crisis.217 After
the financial crisis, hedge fund leverage remained moderate. For example,
Ang, Gorovyy & van Inwegen’s empirical analysis of hedge fund leverage
from December 2004 to October 2009 shows that the leverage of hedge
funds, compared to that of investment banks and broker-dealers, is “fairly
modest.”218 The figure below suggests a more interesting finding about the
leverage of hedge funds, that is, it is counter-cyclical to the market leverage
of listed financial intermediaries.219 The left-hand axis demonstrates the average gross hedge fund leverage and the right-hand axis shows the leverage of
banks, investment banks and the finance sector. The figure suggests that prior
to the financial crisis in mid-2007, while the leverage of regulated investment banks continually increased, hedge fund leverage decreased.220 In the
worst period of the global financial crisis during which the investment banks’
leverage was at its peak, hedge funds’ leverage was at its lowest point.221

216

Patrick McGuire et al., Time Varying Exposures and Leverage in Hedge Funds,
BANK INT’L SETTLEMENT Q. REV., Mar. 2005, at 59, 59–60.
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Patrick McGuire & Kostas Tsatsaronis, Estimating Hedge Fund Leverage 24–31
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According to this study, gross leverage ratio for hedge funds until mid2007 was approximately 2.3.222 This leverage ratio decreased from 2.6 in
June 2007 to a minimum of 1.4 in March 2009.223 In October 2009 at the
end of the period covering the study, the authors estimate the gross leverage ratio across hedge funds to be 1.5. And over the whole period, the average gross leverage ratio was 2.1.224 As the above figure clearly shows,
hedge funds’ leverage is much lower than the leverage of banks and that
of the financial sector in general.225 Overall, the lower levels of leverage
employed by hedge funds could partly be explained by the market discipline imposed by their counterparties, creditors, investors, and the internal
governance mechanisms embedded in the hedge fund industry.226
As far as disclosure is concerned, market forces have increasingly put
pressure on hedge funds to become more transparent.227 Particularly because of an increasing trend towards institutionalization of hedge funds’
investor base, the hedge fund industry is expected to become more transparent. This is partly because institutional investors are in a better position
to negotiate deals with hedge funds in terms of hedge fund transparency.228
Industry associations also exert influence by issuing recommendations of
222

Id. at 119.
Id.
224
Id. They also show that the leverage for event-driven and equity funds is on average
lower (1.3 and 1.6 respectively) than for all other hedge funds, which have an average gross
leverage of 2.1. over their sample. Id. at 105. They further demonstrate that in the recent
crisis both the event-driven and equity sectors reach their highest peak of gross leverage in
mid-2007 and gradually decrease their leverage over the crisis. Id. at 110.
In addition, one of the proxies for measuring leverage is comparing the volatility of
trading returns with the volatility of underlying assets that hedge funds invest in. See
McGuire & Tsatsaronis, supra note 217, at 4. According to this model, the higher the
volatility of trading returns, the greater the risk of the investment. Estimates suggest that
for banks the ratio of this measure was 1.5, which peaked at 2.2 in the second quarter of
2010. However, this measure for average hedge funds was 0.7. See S. Jones, JPMorgan
Highlights Leverage Anomaly, FT.COM. (March 9, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0
/d2038690-4a7d-11e0-82ab-00144feab49a.html#axzz3IUwwEIXV.
225
Ang et al., supra note 15, at 119. Comparison of hedge fund leverage with the level
of leverage of other financial institutions shows that the leverage of hedge funds is just a
small fraction of the leverage of the regulated financial institutions. Id. As an example,
Capital Adequacy Requirements for banks is set at eight percent. With this level of CAR,
regulated bank’s leverage ratio can be 12.5:1. See Daníelsson et al., supra note 124, at 529.
Even after the introduction of Basel III, the level of leverage allowed for banks will be
much higher than the de facto leverage of hedge funds.
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See, e.g., Houman B. Shadab, Hedge Fund Governance, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. FIN. 141,
182–84 (2013).
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best practices for hedge fund transparency and encouraging hedge funds to
comply with them.229
As far as counterparty risk is concerned, the anecdotal evidence suggests significant improvements in counterparty risk management practices
in the aftermath of the collapse of LTCM. The collapse of Amaranth in
2006 is a case in point.230 Although that was a large hedge fund, its collapse
did not pose any material risks to its counterparties or the financial system
because of better risk management techniques employed both by the hedge
fund and its counterparties.231
As far as funding liquidity is concerned, hedge funds can better manage
their liquidity problems partly because they face lower regulatory restrictions. Using gates and side-pocket arrangements, they can impose longer redemption periods on their investors for purposes of liquidity management.
Moreover, some hedge funds also started using more stable sources of funding such as issuing debt, using credit lines from banks, and raising permanent capital through equity offerings.232 It is also expected that the larger
institutional investor base will improve the liquidity management of the
hedge fund industry.233 The impact of indirect regulation in mitigating the
most significant concerns about systemic risk is potentially so pronounced
that some commentators have even suggested that the indirect regulation of
hedge funds is sufficient to cope with their contribution to systemic risk.234
Finally, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, there was criticism
about the limited resources available to regulators.235 Since indirect regulation can result in substantial savings in the use of limited regulatory resources
by substituting government regulators with private surrogate regulators, it
should be preferable to direct regulation. The above arguments suggest that,
229

Id. Residual concerns about hedge fund transparency are to a great extent resolved
by the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act in the US, and the Alternative Investment Fund
Managers Directive (AIFMD) in the EU.
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Roach, Jr., supra note 7, at 171. See also Roger Ferguson & David Laster, Hedge
Funds and Systemic Risk, in FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW; SPECIAL ISSUE, HEDGE FUNDS
45, 51 (Banque de France ed., 2007).
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BUT CONTINUED ATTENTION IS NEEDED 3 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new
.items/d08200.pdf.
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King & Maier, supra note 76, at 295.
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Id.
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Cole et al., supra note 19, at 11–12.
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The limited resources at the disposal of regulators are pushing them to be efficient
in using those resources. For example, the FSA stressed the need for prioritizing regulatory objectives and methods and offered the principles-based regulation in response to
such a demand. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 196, at 3.
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at least in qualitative terms, the support for the indirect regulation of hedge
funds far exceeds the support for direct regulation. This outcome is reflected
in the policy debate. Institutional advocates of the indirect regulation of
hedge funds include, inter alia, the following: the Group of Seven (G7), the
President’s Working Group (PWG), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF),
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Counterparty
Risk Management Policy Group II (CRMPG II), the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), and the European Central Bank (ECB).236
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF AND REMEDIES FOR INDIRECT
REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS
Commentators suggest that there are a number of problems with the
indirect regulation of hedge funds through prime brokers,237 which may
undermine the effectiveness of the market discipline on hedge funds. Hedge
fund literature raises a number of problems with respect to indirect regulation. However, even acknowledging these problems with indirect regulation, it is unlikely that such problems would be solved by direct regulation
of hedge funds. On the contrary, regulating prime brokers rather than the
hedge funds themselves can still address these problems.
A. Use of Multiple Prime Brokers by Hedge Funds
The global financial crisis and the failures or near-failures of prime
brokers showed that counterparty risk management through diversification
is equally (if not more) important for hedge funds than it is for their prime
brokers.238 Therefore, as a response to or a hedge against the counterparty
risks arising from the failure of prime brokers, and to avoid too much exposure to a single prime broker, hedge funds have diversified their prime
brokers both domestically and internationally.239 As a result, a single prime
broker is no longer informed of all of its hedge fund clients’ transactions.
This means that prime brokers are no longer able to observe the entire trading activities of hedge funds and raise early red flags, where necessary.
This increasingly diminishing knowledge of hedge fund activities and risks
236

See ATHANASSIOU, supra note 25, at 227–28.
See Houman B. Shadab, The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation, REG., Spring
2007, at 37, available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation
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weakens the argument in favor of delegating the regulatory functions to
hedge funds’ prime brokers for fear that they might not be capable of effectively monitoring such activities and risks.240
In addition, as mentioned earlier, the supply of monitoring is similar to
the supply of public goods.241 Since monitoring is costly and its benefits are
not excludable, it is prone to free riding.242 Hence, individual firms have an
incentive to free ride on the monitoring and due diligence efforts of other
firms, which can lead to inadequate collective discipline among creditors.243
This argument based on the insufficient discipline by prime brokers,
however, does not undermine the case for indirect regulation. Rather, this
argument shows that it is important to devise mechanisms to provide prime
brokers with adequate incentives to monitor.
B. Competition Among Prime Brokers and Ineffectiveness of
Indirect Regulation
One of the concerns about the indirect regulation of hedge funds
through their prime brokers is that the prime brokers lack sufficient incentives to carry out the regulatory functions assigned to them.244 In the prime
finance industry, there is intense competition between prime brokers in
attracting profitable hedge fund business.245 The prime finance industry
tends to be oligopolistic; gaining market share in such a market structure is
of crucial importance.246 In addition, the fact that the hedge fund industry
itself is highly concentrated247 adds more fuel to already burning competition between prime brokers. High concentration means that prime brokers
derive substantial returns from attracting one large hedge fund. Given
prime brokers’ appetite for gaining market share in such an oligopolistic
market, attracting one large hedge fund with a substantial market share is
240
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crucial for their competitiveness. Consequently, prime brokers have an incentive to offer more favorable terms to hedge fund clients such as lower
margin requirements, which allow for higher leverage.
In addition, the competition between prime brokers for hedge fund business gives hedge funds more bargaining power. This enables hedge funds to
negotiate deals with prime brokers that foster their own interest, but are perhaps at the expense of the public interest because such deals loosen (indirect)
regulatory requirements and may put financial stability at risk. Larger hedge
funds, which tend to be more systemically important, are more likely to negotiate and cut better and more advantageous deals with their prime brokers
in terms of collateral, margin rates, and haircuts. Reducing margin rates or
haircuts implies that the prime brokers will be more exposed to the hedge
funds’ counterparty risks.248 These increased counterparty risks make them
ineffective enforcers of market discipline. Furthermore, prime brokers that
have substantial investments in hedge funds may not exert any market discipline on hedge funds at all. Because of their heightened exposure to hedge
fund risk, prime brokers have an incentive to bail out the failing hedge
funds in which they have a substantial investment for fear that their failure
might put substantial stress on their own balance sheet.
In short, the short-term competitive pressures between prime brokers
could endanger the effectiveness of indirect regulation.249 Additionally, risk
management practices are vulnerable to erosion by competitive pressures.250
This weakens the market discipline on hedge funds. Therefore, the contribution of hedge funds to systemic risk can best be achieved through government regulation.251
However, government action does not necessitate direct regulatory measures. As argued before, prime brokers’ competition in regulating hedge
funds not only diminishes the opportunities for regulatory capture among
prime brokers, but also enhances the mechanisms of monitoring hedge
funds.252 On the one hand, the previous discussion on regulatory capture,
the theory of regulatory tournament, and the efficiency of regulatory competition has at least two implications for hedge fund regulation. These theories
imply that delegating hedge fund regulation to the hedge funds’ counterparties not only decreases the likelihood of regulatory capture,253 but also
248
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increases the efficiency of regulation, because it provides regulators with
incentives to compete with each other. On the other hand, since several
prime brokers will implement the indirect regulation of hedge funds, it implies that hedge funds are disciplined in a decentralized fashion via rules
initially applied to banks.
C. Lack of Transparency in Prime Finance Industry
The lack of transparency in the prime brokerage business originates
from the fact that the prime brokerage business is embedded within the universal banking system.254 In other words, the operating vehicle of a prime
broker is often a vehicle within large and complex investment banks. Under
the universal banking system, the bank, as one legal entity, offers a full range
of banking and non-banking financial services.255 The services offered by
universal banks include financial intermediation, liquidity provision (market
making), payment facilities, financial instrument trading, proprietary trading, brokerage services, advisory services, investment management, and
insurance services.256 In other words, universal banks can engage in both
commercial and investment banking activities. Commercial banking involves
taking deposits and making loans.257 Although the sources of funding and
the methods through which commercial banks make loans are diversified,
taking deposits and making loans remains the core activity of the commercial banks.258 On the contrary, investment banking involves activities such
as underwriting (assisting firms in raising capital), advisory services, mergers and acquisitions, loan restructuring, trading and brokerage services,
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and asset management services, including both traditional and alternative
asset management.259
In the United States, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 created a wall between
investment banking and commercial banking.260 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999 eventually tore down that wall, but it was hardly impenetrable
during the period in which it was intact.261 Gramm-Leach-Bliley followed a
period of deregulation in which commercial banks expanded their activities
into securities underwriting.262 Indeed, at the end of the 20th century, the
investment banks could operate with the same powers as they did in the
beginning of the century.263 The fall of the Glass-Steagall wall started the
period in which universal banks dominated financial markets.264
Even if there are already substantial regulatory requirements with respect to information disclosure, complexity in the intermingling of the
prime brokerage business with other universal banking functions makes it
difficult for regulators to trace activities falling under the ambit of prime
brokerage.265 Furthermore, there is no mechanism for independent assessment of the risks and transparency of the prime broker’s legal entity separate from that of the bank within which it is embedded.266 Thus, there is a
need for increased transparency requirements targeting the prime brokers
as separate legal entities.
D. Collateral Rehypothecation and How It Affects the Relationships
Between Hedge Funds and Prime Brokers
Rehypothecation occurs when an intermediary holding securities on behalf of investors grants a security interest or encumbers those securities to
obtain financing for itself.267 In the context of the relationship between
hedge funds and prime brokers, rehypothecation is the reuse of hedge
funds’ collateral by prime brokers in other transactions with other financial
259
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intermediaries completely unrelated to the original transaction.268 Though
rehypothecation provides a source of inexpensive financing for financial
institutions,269 such a practice is believed to be dangerous for financial
stability, particularly if one looks at how the global financial crisis manifested itself—namely as withdrawals of collateral from investment banks
such as Lehman Brothers.270 The practice of rehypothecation gives rise to
a number of concerns, the most important of which is systemic risk.
Systemic risk originates from uncertainty stemming from falling collateral prices and potential runs on the banks by the firms whose collateral is
being rehypothecated.271 A run by hedge funds might occur because of the
uncertainty of prime brokerage business when they have rehypothecated
the collateral. Unable to locate the collateral initially posted by hedge funds
to prime brokers, hedge funds fearing or experiencing distress might suddenly run to close their position with their prime brokers. This may cause
serious distress to the prime brokers.
A second concern relates to the conflicts of interest. This concern originates from the reuse of collateral in other transactions. The possibility of
reuse of collateral gives additional incentives for prime brokers to attract
more hedge funds by loosening the terms of the loans (e.g., requiring lower
margins). This behavior tends to increase systemic risk.
Partly because of these concerns, and given the symbiotic relationship
between hedge funds and prime brokers, delegating regulatory functions to
prime brokers would be a mistake.272 The interests of prime brokers in attracting hedge funds and collateral to be used for their own investments in
derivatives transactions may give rise to a conflict between their delegated
regulatory tasks with their profit maximizing strategies. In other words, the
possibility of rehypothecation creates incentives for prime brokers to not
apply the due diligence standards expected of them. Such conflicts of interest can potentially undermine the effectiveness of the indirect regulation
of hedge funds through prime brokers. Requiring prime brokers to limit
268
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and/or disclose the reuse of the collateral posted by hedge funds can help
mitigate such concerns.
In addition, prior to the enactment of the U.S. Private Fund Investment
Advisers Registration Act (title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act),273 some prime
brokers invested in hedge funds or sponsored hedge funds themselves, a
practice that is to a large extent prohibited under current regulations.274
Having a substantial investment in hedge funds, the prime brokers would
have insufficient incentives to take on regulatory functions, especially if
implementing such monitoring functions involved putting at risk their own
proprietary trading and investment in hedge funds.
The above arguments cast some doubt about the effectiveness of the
indirect regulation of hedge funds through prime brokers. However, these
arguments cannot be viewed as supporting the direct regulation of hedge
funds. If anything, the above arguments support more direct regulation of
prime brokers rather than of hedge funds.
E. Moral Hazard Spillovers Arising from Bank Regulation
Moral hazard is a ubiquitous feature of financial regulation, specifically where such regulation is aimed at coping with problems of financial
stability.275 The government’s attempts to preserve financial stability often
requires the provision of some sort of safety net for systemically important
financial institutions.276 However, this safety net will give financial institutions the impression that the government will bear the consequences of their
risk taking. This side effect of the safety net encourages regulated entities
to engage in opportunistic behavior.277
Implicit and explicit government guarantees offered to banks can create
moral hazard. Such a problem in turn encourages excessive risk taking by
giant banks that are too-big-to-fail. This problem may not be limited to the
banks themselves. In turn, it can be transmitted to other less regulated parts
of the financial system as those banks transact with hedge funds and private
equity funds.278 For a long time, there were fears by central bankers that
banks that take risks in the derivatives markets would essentially exploit their
273
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unique access to deposit insurance and discounted Federal Reserve funds.279
By the same token, a bank’s investment in a hedge fund might be similarly
exploitive in that such investment would also be backed by the FDIC and
the Fed. Moral hazard problems can also occur when hedge funds are subject to indirect regulation. For instance, banks’ and elite prime brokers’ reliance on bailouts may affect their counterparty credit risk management and
induce them to take suboptimal care in dealing with hedge funds.280
In addition, some prime brokers function as hedge fund “hotels”, meaning that hedge funds are embedded within them.281 Such an institutional
setting can result in compromised risk management incentives in the relationship between hedge funds and prime brokers. Moreover, this arrangement can cause reputational damage to the prime broker when a hedge fund
operating within a certain prime brokerage firm fails. For example, prior
to the recent financial crisis, the collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds in
the spring of 2007 imposed substantial losses to the parent company, which
was a systemically important investment bank.282 In that case, the collapse
of hedge funds did not pose a substantial credit risk to Bear Stearns.283
However, Bear Stearns bailed them out due to reputational concerns that
the failure of such entities could raise concerns about the safety and soundness of the firm itself.284 The bailout highlighted concerns about the indirect
subsidization of hedge funds by taxpayers through the parent organization’s
access to the Federal Reserve discount window and implicit guarantee of a
bailout of a too-big-to-fail parent company. Such an opportunity for excessive risk taking means that hedge funds managers do not bear the entire
costs and consequences of their risk taking.285
Although this argument seems to question the benefits of indirect regulation, it is in fact another argument for regulating prime brokers rather than
hedge funds themselves. To address such a problem, the Dodd-Frank Act
limits the banking entities’ investment in, and sponsorship of, hedge funds
279
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through the Volcker Rule.286 Indeed, the Volcker Rule limits banking
entities’ ability to invest the taxpayer-subsidized capital in hedge funds.287
Under this rule, it will be very unlikely for hedge funds to be again bailed
out by those subsidized banks.288
F. Costs of Indirect Regulation for the Intermediated Regulators
There are certain factors undermining the effectiveness of the indirect
regulation of hedge funds through their prime brokers, which are described
in the arguments above. However, given the costs and impediments associated with direct regulation, it makes more sense to enhance and harness
the market discipline already in place for hedge funds rather than to regulate them directly. In fact, the latter strategy is prone to circumvention by
hedge funds.
However, one of the neglected features in the majority of the proposals
for indirect regulation is the additional cost that the indirect regulation imposes on the entity transmitting the effects of regulation. In deciding how
to allocate the costs of regulation, however, prime brokers can afford such
costs better than hedge funds, because they are already regulated and have
the infrastructure (such as compliance offices) to deal with new regulatory
requirements. In addition, economies of scale in compliance costs suggest
that larger firms are better positioned to absorb such costs. Hedge funds are
relatively small in size, which eliminates the economies of scale in compliance costs. Moreover, they are transient in nature, which makes substantial
investments in compliance unthinkable. Therefore, direct regulation of
hedge funds would impose compliance costs that may discourage the hedge
fund business altogether.289
CONCLUSION
In this Article we have argued that the choice between the direct and indirect regulation of hedge funds should be based on the relative effectiveness
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of direct and indirect regulation in addressing hedge funds’ contribution to
systemic risk at the lowest cost. The proxies for measuring the effectiveness
of indirect regulation in mitigating potential systemic risks of hedge funds
such as reduced leverage, improved transparency, counterparty risk management, and funding liquidity suggest that indirect regulation could have a significant impact. In fact, the effectiveness of indirect regulation is potentially
so great that it could be sufficient to cope with the systemic risk generated by
hedge funds. On the contrary, direct regulation is unlikely to address hedge
funds’ contribution to systemic risk without jeopardizing their benefits to
financial markets. In addition, the greatest obstacle to the success of direct
regulation remains regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds.
There are, however, arguments against the indirect regulation of hedge
funds that we have reviewed in this Article. These arguments suggest that
even if indirect regulation were effective, it would be far from sufficient to
cope with systemic risk. Most critiques of indirect regulation focus on its
potential shortcomings. However, we argue that mere problems with indirect regulation do not necessarily imply that direct regulation is the better
regulatory alternative. In our view, the counterarguments for the effectiveness of indirect regulation imply that there is a need for direct regulation
of hedge funds’ counterparties (not hedge funds themselves) in order to
enhance market discipline. Needless to say, direct regulation of counterparties, particularly prime brokers, is the essence of the indirect regulation
model being advocated in this Article.
In this Article we argue for the indirect regulation of hedge funds. In
this model of regulation, “surrogate regulators” such as investors, counterparties, creditors, rating agencies, and hedge fund professional associations
can play a role and reinforce the market discipline in addition to government agencies. From this perspective, the introduction of the Volcker Rule
in the Dodd-Frank Act as an indirect measure for regulating hedge funds is
a positive move towards addressing the potential contribution of hedge
funds to financial instability.

